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7.1  Introduction 
The introduction of Tagamet into the U.S. market in 1977 marked the begin- 
ning of a revolutionary treatment for ulcers and the emergence of a new indus- 
try. What distinguished the products of this new industry was their ability to 
heal ulcers and treat preulcer conditions pharmacologically on an outpatient 
basis, thereby substituting for traditional, and costly, hospital admissions and 
surgeries. Tagamet, known medically as an H,-receptor  antagonist, promotes 
the healing of ulcers by reducing the secretion of acid by the stomach. 
A striking feature of the antiulcer market is that it has sustained growth in 
sales (quantity, not just revenue) for over fifteen years and still shows no sign 
of slowing. New prescribing habits have clearly diffused to an ever increasing 
number of physicians. Today there are a total of four H,-receptor  antagonists: 
Tagamet, Zantac, Pepcid, and Axid. Zantac is now the United States’ (and the 
world’s)  largest-selling prescription  drug, having estimated worldwide sales 
in  1992 of about $3.5 billion. Moreover, Tagamet is also among the ten top- 
selling prescription drugs in the United States.’ 
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22d, Prilosec 49th, and Axid 67th. 
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In this paper we attempt to explain the growth and changing composition of 
the antiulcer drug market. Although we examine the impacts of  pricing and 
product quality, we devote particular attention to the role of firms’ marketing 
efforts. We distinguish between two types of marketing: (1) that which concen- 
trates on bringing new consumers into the market (“industry-expanding’’ ad- 
vertising), and (2) that which concentrates on competing for market  shares 
from these consumers (“rivalrous” advertising). Note that of these two types, 
market-expanding  advertising has particular  economic  importance in a new 
market, because no matter how potentially beneficial is the new product, it can 
generate no consumer’s surplus until consumers have been informed about the 
new product and have been induced to experiment with it. 
As others have done, we estimate the effects of industry-expanding advertis- 
ing on sales. However, we also examine how the effectiveness of this socially 
beneficial  type  of  advertising  vanes with  market  structure. We  exploit  two 
facts. First, in the earliest years of the market when Tagamet was a monopoly 
product all of  the Tagamet advertising was, by definition, market-expanding. 
Second, the timing  of entry is largely  exogenous in this industry, for patent 
protection ensures that firms cannot enter until their research laboratories de- 
velop a new molecule that has the desired impact and until approval for use is 
given by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
We  also analyze factors affecting the market shares earned by  the limited 
number of firms in this market. A principal theme is that the patent and pioneer 
advantages to Tagamet were overcome by Zantac, the second entrant, through 
costly but effective marketing efforts, especially efforts that  interacted  with 
the apparent existence of  more favorable side-effect profiles than Tagamet’s. 
Moreover,  Zantac’s relative  price,  although higher than  Tagamet’s, declined 
substantially over time. Thus, evidence from this industry suggests that while 
the barriers to entry from patent and first-mover advantages are considerable, 
they are not insurmountable. 
Our empirical analysis is based on an unusually rich and detailed data set. 
Beginning with the introduction of Tagamet in July  1977, we have obtained 
monthly data, for each of the products in this market, on quantity and average 
price of sales (separately for the retail drugstore and hospital markets); market- 
ing efforts (minutes of detailing by  sales representatives to physicians, and 
professional medical journal advertising); and product-quality information, in- 
cluding side-effect profiles, efficacy, dosage forms, and indications for which 
the product had received approval from the FDA. 
We begin in section 7.2 by providing background information on ulcers and 
ulcer treatments. Then in section 7.3 we present an overview of  data trends. 
We  describe the  growth of  the  antiulcer market,  as well  as the pricing and 
marketing behavior of the various market participants. We move on in section 
7.4 to develop an econometric framework for modeling the growth of the anti- 
ulcer industry. In particular, we examine the effects of ‘‘informative’’  or market- 
expanding marketing efforts on industry sales. In section 7.5 we report findings 279  The U.S.  Antiulcer Drug Industry 
from an analogous attempt to model factors affecting market shares earned by 
the various products in this industry. Here we examine in particular the roles 
of rivalrous marketing, product quality, order of entry, and price competition. 
Finally, in section 7.6 we offer some concluding observations and suggestions 
for future research. The paper also includes a data appendix. 
7.2  Background on Ulcer Treatments 
Peptic ulcer disease occurs in 10-15  percent of the US.  population.* Ulcers 
located in the  stomach proper  are termed  gastric ulcers, while those in the 
duodenum (the bulb connecting the stomach to the small intestine) are called 
duodenal ulcers. A related  nonulcerous condition is gastroesophageal reflux 
disease (GERD), which occurs in the esophagus. What the three conditions 
have in common  is that they involve inflammation of tissue  in the digestive 
tract that is exacerbated by the presence of the body’s naturally occurring gas- 
tric acid. GERD and duodenal ulcers have roughly the same rates of occurrence 
in the U.S. population, whereas gastric ulcers are about one-fourth as likely. 
The incidence of ulcers in adult males is about twice that in adult females and 
appears to be most common in individuals twenty to fifty years old. 
Ulcers have a long history  of clinical treatment. There is evidence that al- 
ready in the first century A.D., coral powder  (calcium carbonate, an antacid) 
was used to relieve symptoms of dyspepsia (see Fine, Dannenberg, and Zakim 
1988). Early  in  the  twentieth  century,  conventional  medical  wisdom  con- 
formed to the notion “no acid, no ulcer.” As a result, until the  1970s recom- 
mended  treatments  sought to neutralize  gastric acid and often consisted  of 
hourly feedings of milk and/or antacids, as well as a dietary reduction of acidic 
food and drink. If ulcers persisted, surgery was undertaken. It is worth noting 
that while antacids such as Maalox and Mylanta neutralize gastric acid, they 
do not decrease the rate of gastric secretions (they may in fact increase them). 
Moreover, the required dosages of  antacids are typically quite large, side ef- 
fects can be considerable, and adverse interactions with other drugs are not 
uncommon. As a result, with antacids patient compliance can be problematic. 
An alternative ulcer treatment involves acid suppression with anticholiner- 
gics, such as Pro-Banthine and atropine. Anticholinergic agents decrease acid 
secretion by  inhibiting receptors for the hormone  acetylcholine in the acid- 
producing cells of the stomach lining. However, these agents cause consider- 
ably unpleasant reactions, because acetylcholine is involved in a number of 
biochemical processes other than the secretion of gastric acid, and anticholin- 
ergics tend to be nonselective. The side effects of dry mouth, blurred vision, 
urinary retention, abnormally rapid heartbeat, and drying of bronchial secre- 
tions are particularly frequent. 
2. The material in this section is taken in large part from Scouler (1993) and the references cited 
therein. Also see Fine, Dannenberg, and Zakim (1988) and McKenzie et al. (1990). 280  E. R. Berndt, L. T. Bui, D. H. Lucking-Reiley, and G. L. Urban 
In 1977 a revolutionary form of antiulcer drug was introduced to the United 
States, known as an H,-receptor  antag~nist.~  H,-receptor  antagonists act by 
blocking  the histamine-2 (H,)  receptor  on parietal cells in the lining of the 
stomach-cells  that produce gastric acid. Histamine-2 is one of three “messen- 
ger molecules” (along with gastrine and acetylcholine) that can stimulate the 
production of acid by the parietal cells. By blocking the receptor for H,  (and, 
unlike the anticholinergic drugs, avoiding any interference with other biochem- 
ical processes), an H,-antagonist  can decrease overall acid concentration in the 
stomach. H,-antagonist  healing rates are very high. A four- to six-week treat- 
ment period, for example, is associated with a healing rate of 70-80  percent 
for patients suffering from duodenal ulcers. 
SmithKline  was  the  first  pharmaceutical  company  to  introduce  an  H,- 
antagonist in the U.S. market (in August  1977), and they dubbed it Tagamet 
(its chemical name is cimetidine). Thereafter three companies followed suit- 
Glaxo with Zantac (ranitidine) in June 1983, Merck with Pepcid (famotidine) 
in October 1986, and Lilly with Axid (nizatidine) in April 1988. Each of these 
four H,-antagonists  is a slightly different chemical entity. Tagamet’s patent pro- 
tection could not prevent entry by such therapeutic substitutes. 
Zantac  was  marketed  very  aggressively  by  Glaxo,  in  partnership  with 
Hoffmann-LaRoche, and was also priced at a premium over Tagamet. Detailers 
(sales representatives who call on physicians) emphasized that unlike Tagamet, 
whose original dosage required it to be taken four times daily, Zantac needed 
to be taken only twice per day.  Moreover, Zantac detailers highlighted side- 
effect profiles that had accumulated with Tagamet-nausea,  diarrhea, drowsi- 
ness, decreased sperm count, gynecomastia (swelling of the breasts in males), 
and drug  interaction^.^ Within eighteen months Tagamet responded to Zantac 
by  introducing  a twice-per-day  version  of its drug, but  it continued to find 
itself on the defensive in terms of alleged side-effect and adverse-interaction 
profiles. A prolonged rivalry then ensued, first between Tagamet and Zantac in 
the form of new versions whose dosages were but once per day (thereby facili- 
tating patient compliance even further), and later including additional competi- 
tion from the newly entered Pepcid and Axid, each available with a once-daily 
dosage regimen. 
In addition to side-effect profiles  and frequency of dosage, another form 
of rivalry among the four H,-antagonists  involved FDA-approved  treatments 
(indications). Since several distinct types of ulcerous conditions exist, similar 
drug products can compete on the basis of efficacy for different indications. In 
the United States, before a drug can be introduced into the market, the FDA 
must grant approval for at least one indication. When Tagamet was originally 
introduced into the U.S. market in August 1977, its approval was for duodenal 
3. Tagamet was introduced into the United Kingdom one year earlier, in 1976. 
4. By June 1983, Tagamet had registered ten adverse interactions at the FDA. Zantac recorded 
its first adverse interaction in January 1992. 281  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
ulcers; Tagamet was also the first to be approved for duodenal ulcer mainte- 
nance treatment (to prevent recurrence of a newly healed duodenal ulcer) in 
April  1980, and gastric ulcers in December  1982. However, Zantac was the 
first to obtain approval for the GERD indication (May 1986),5  and it was not 
until March 1991 that Tagamet obtained FDA approval for GERD. It is worth 
noting that once FDA approval for an indication is granted, the manufacturer 
is permitted to provide promotional and marketing material only for approved 
indications. Thus, even though Tagamet had clinical effects very similar to 
Zantac’s, suggesting that it would probably be effective in the treatment  of 
GERD, Tagamet promotions were not permitted to mention GERD until 1991. 
Although physicians often prescribe drugs for indications not approved by the 
FDA (called off-label prescribing), not having FDA approval for an indication 
which is held by a competitive product may constitute a signficant disadvan- 
tage in the marketplace. Hence, even though Tagamet pioneered in the three 
antiulcer indications, the fact that it lagged behind Zantac in the relatively pop- 
ulous GERD market was of considerable importance. 
Today the  four H,-antagonist  drugs are frequently viewed as being  “. . . 
equally efficacious in their ability to suppress acid secretion” (McKenzie et al. 
1990,58), but different in their pharmacological profiles. McKenzie et al. note 
that Tagamet is “the H,-antagonist  implicated with the most side effects and 
drug interactions,” and that such adverse impacts occur “to a lesser extent” 
with Zantac. The third and fourth entrants-Pepcid  and Axid-appear  to have 
even fewer drug interactions and side effects. What is not yet clear, however, 
is the extent to which apparent differences in side-effect profiles simply reflect 
differential  lengths of time over which the various drugs have been able to 
accumulate medical experience. 
Modern ulcer medicines are not restricted to H,-antagonists. One alternative 
therapy is Carafate (sucralfate), introduced into the United States by Marion 
Labs in August  1981. Instead of  inhibiting acid secretion, Carafate acts by 
forming a protective coating over the ulcer that in turn promotes healing. While 
it is relatively free from side effects, Carafate has problems of convenience 
and compliance, since it must be taken four times per day, always on an empty 
stomach (before meals). It also acts more slowly than the acid inhibitors in 
relieving pain. For these reasons, Carafate serves a market niche, being used 
predominantly for older patients and patients in intensive care. 
Another entrant in the antiulcer market is Cytotec (misoprostol), introduced 
in December  1988. Cytotec has been targeted  at ulcers associated with the 
use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs-pain  relievers such as 
Motrin). Its rather small market niche consists of patients who take NSAIDs 
chronically and are at greater risk for the development of peptic ulcer disease 
or complications from peptic ulcers-particularly  the elderly, those with previ- 
5. Discussions with industry officials suggest that Glaxo actually invented the GERD indication 
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ous ulcers  or concomitant debilitating diseases, and patients who smoke. A 
common side effect of Cytotec, however, is diarrhea, although it can often be 
mitigated by adjusting the dosage. 
The most recent treatment innovation to enter the antiulcer market is Prilo- 
sec (omeprazole), introduced into the United States by Merck Sharp & Dohme 
in September 1989.'j Prilosec is a powerful new drug known as a proton-pump 
inhibitor. It acts by  directly blocking the action of the proton pump, which is 
the biochemical mechanism that actually produces the  acid in the stomach. 
Initially  approved for only the GERD indication, in June  1991 Prilosec was 
approved by  the FDA for duodenal ulcer treatment. Originally approved only 
for short-term use, in 1995 the FDA gave approval for long-term maintenance 
usage. Dosing for Prilosec is unique in that it is supplied in a timed-release 
capsule, thus reducing dosage to once per day but yielding continuous levels 
of the drug within the body throughout the day. 
With this brief overview on ulcer drugs and ulcer treatments as background, 
we now move on to a discussion of the pricing and marketing behavior of the 
manufacturers, the sales and market shares they attained, and the data sources 
underlying these statistics. 
7.3  Overview of the Data 
Most of the data used in this study originated with IMS America, a Philadel- 
phia-based firm that independently collects data on the sales and marketing of 
pharmaceutical products. IMS sells its data to pharmaceutical manufacturers 
for their use in formulating marketing strategy.'  IMS sales data track prescrip- 
tion pharmaceutical purchases made by hospitals and by retailers; market seg- 
ments  not  monitored  by  IMS  include  food  stores,  dispensing  physicians, 
HMOs, mail order, nursing homes, and clinics. IMS estimates that its drugstore 
audit covers 67 percent of the U.S. pharmaceutical market and that its hospital 
audit encompasses an additional 16 percent8 
The level of aggregation of the IMS purchase data is the presentational form, 
for example, bottles of 30 tablets of 150 mg strength. For each presentational 
form, we compute the average price as dollar purchases divided by number of 
units. We also convert these price and quantity measures into patient-days and 
price per patient-day, using the recommended daily dosage for duodenal ulcer 
treatment as the transformation factor. These monthly data series begin in Au- 
gust 1977 and continue through May  1993. 
6. Merck obtained the rights to market Prilosec in the United States from AB Astra of Sweden. 
Prilosec was originally named Losec; however, its name was changed because of confusion sur- 
rounding the similarity of the name Losec to that of Lasix, a common diuretic. 
7. IMS America. 660 W.  Germantown  Pike, Plymouth  Meeting, Pennsylvania  19462 (215- 
834-5000). 
8. Information on IMS is taken from the IMS Pharmaceutical  Database Manual. 283  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
In addition to price and quantity data on drug purchases, we employ IMS 
data on marketing efforts from their Personal Selling Audit, earlier called the 
IMS National Detailing Audit. Based on a panel of about thirty-five hundred 
physicians who report the number of  visits and minutes spent with detailers 
discussing particular drug products, IMS computes monthly detailing efforts 
by drug.’ Using an estimated cost per detailing visit, IMS also estimates total 
detailing expenditures. Medical journal advertising expenditures are estimated 
by IMS in their National Journal Audit. Based on the number of square inches 
and pages of advertisements in about three hundred major medical journals, as 
well as features such as the number of colors in each advertisement, IMS uses 
standard rate sheets to estimate total dollars of journal advertising, monthly, 
by product. We convert these current-dollar expenditures into constant-dollar 
magnitudes using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ (BLS’s) producer price index 
for “advertising in professional and institutional periodicals.” 
Discussions with industry personnel suggest that while these detailing and 
journal  advertising  expenditures  likely  understate  total  promotion  costs 
(booths and promotions at conferences are not included, for example), there is 
no reason to suspect that the proportions differ across products, and thus we 
are led to believe that the relative expenditure data series are likely to be rea- 
sonably accurate. It is worth noting, incidentally, that according to one ob- 
server, in the early 1990s in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, approximately 
$3.1 billion was spent on detailing, about $700 million was spent annually on 
journal  advertising and direct-mail promotions, medical-education  expenses 
accounted for  about  $400  million, and  uses  of  other forms  of  media  and 
communication  amounted to approximately $300 million annually (Cearnal 
1992,23). 
Finally, data on recommended daily dosages and product-specific attribute 
information are taken from Physicians ’ Desk Reference, annual issues from 
1978 to  1993, and US.  Pharmacopeia Convention Dispensing Information. 
Further details regarding data sources and transformations are presented in the 
data appendix. 
With this background regarding data sources, we now present an overview 
of  data trends. In figure 7.1 we plot  the quantity of  U.S. sales (number of 
patient-days of  duodenal  ulcer  therapy) over time,  separately  for the retail 
drugstore and hospital markets, disaggregated into the H,-antagonists  (Taga- 
met,  Zantac,  Pepcid,  and  Axid)  and  all  seven  antiulcer  drugs  (the  H2- 
antagonists plus Carafate, Cytotec, and Prilosec). Starting from zero in August 
1977, by May 1993 total monthly sales were almost 130 million patient-days; 
of this, approximately 93 percent was sold via retail drugstores. Broken down 
by drug type, the H,-antagonist class accounted for approximately 84 percent 
of total sales, while the other antiulcer drugs made up the remaining  16 per- 
9. This sample size has increased with time. The sample was thirty-five hundred m  1993. In the 
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cent. Hospital sales accounted for only 7 percent of total H,-antagonist sales. 
Because of this market dominance, hereafter we confine our analysis to the H,- 
antagonist drugstore market. 
The growth of  H,-antagonist  sales over time has been remarkably  steady. 
For example, if one runs a simple regression of log sales on a constant and a 
monthly time counter, one obtains 
In(Q,,)  = 16.4 + 0.012t,  R2 = 0.82, 
implying an average annual growth rate (AAGR) of about 15 percent. 
In figure 7.2 we plot market shares of H,-antagonist drugstore sales for the 
four H,-antagonist drugs. Although Tagamet was the pioneer, Zantac entered 
in July 1983, and within one year it had already captured about 25 percent of 
the total Tagamet-Zantac market. Tagamet’s share continued to decline when 
Pepcid entered in October 1986, but Pepcid was less successful than Zantac; 
one year after entry, Pepcid had a market share of only approximately 8 per- 
cent. The sales of Zantac grew remarkably quickly and steadily, and by January 
1988 Zantac sales overtook those of Tagamet. At about the same time (April 
1988), Axid entered the market; as fourth entrant, however, Axid faced consid- 
erable competition, and after one year, its sales accounted for only about a 4 
percent market share. By the end of our sample in May 1993, Zantac had cap- 
tured about 55 percent of the quantity market share, Tagamet 21 percent, Pep- 
cid 15 percent, and Axid 9 percent. 
Although the entry of Zantac into the H,-antagonist market increased total 
market sales, the sales of Tagamet fell. As shown in figure 7.3, drugstore sales 
of Tagamet grew at a very rapid rate after entry in 1977, then began to level off 
a bit from 1981 to  1983, and although they peaked at about 46 million patient- 
days in April  1984, Tagamet’s sales tended to decline after Zantac’s entry in 
1983. This general decline in sales continued until the end of our sample, when 
Tagamet’s monthly  sales were  less than  half  their peak-about  21 million 
patient-days. By contrast, sales of Zantac generally increased over time, and 
by May 1993 Zantac accounted for about 54 million patient-days per month. 
Although Zantac’s sales increased with time, as can be seen in figure 7.3, there 
was a modest decline in the growth slope beginning in early 1988, coinciding 
with a slight rebound in Tagamet sales and the effects of entry by the fourth 
entrant, Axid. Although both Pepcid and Axid recorded considerable growth 
in sales, they clearly  were dominated by  the two earliest entrants, Tagamet 
and Zantac. 
An interesting phenomenon occurs in the pricing behavior of the four prod- 
ucts over this tumultuous time period. Price per day of duodenal therapy (based 
on recommended dosages, and adjusted for inflation using the overall Con- 
sumer Price Index [CPI] with 1982-84  = 1.00) is displayed for the four prod- 
ucts in figure 7.4. After original entry, until it faced competition from Zantac, 
Tagamet gradually decreased its real price from about $1  .OO to about $0.80 per 
day. When Zantac entered in late 1983, it charged a substantial premium ($1.25 I 
70%  -- 
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per day, a 56 percent premium). Thereafter, prices of both Zantac and Tagamet 
rose with time, although Tagamet’s prices increased more rapidly. By the end 
of the sample, the Zantac price premium had narrowed from about 56 percent 
to 25 percent. 
The third and fourth entrants, Pepcid and Axid, followed price policies that 
fell generally somewhere between those of Tagamet and Zantac. At the end of 
the sample period covered by  our data, the price per day of therapy ranged 
from a low of about $1.4 1 per day for Pepcid to a high of $1.80 per day for 
Zantac. Prices for Tagamet and Axid fell between these amounts, at $1.44 and 
$1.62,  respectively. An  interesting  recent  development is that in November 
1993 (after the end of our sample), Tagamet announced a major change in its 
pricing policy, offering rebates directly to consumers (see Freudenheim 1993). 
Finally, as is seen in figure 7.4, there does not appear to be any substantial 
competitive pricing policy response by incumbents to the entry of new compet- 
itors into the H,-antagonist  market. Indeed, the only price-trend break that co- 
incides with a new entry is that for Tagamet upon entry by Zantac, which re- 
sulted in the incumbent Tagamet increasing rather than decreasing its price.I0 
Note also that price trends do not show breaks around the times of  entry by 
Pepcid and Axid. 
Pricing policy, however, is not the only instrument for competitive rivals. In 
the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, marketing plays a very significant role. In 
figure 7.5 we plot monthly  minutes of detailing for the two principal rivals, 
Tagamet and Zantac; cumulative detailing minutes since the product’s launch 
are plotted for each H,-antagonist  drug in figure 7.6. 
As shown in figure 7.5, the launch of Tagamet coincided with a very substan- 
tial detailing effort-about  180,000  minutes in September 1977-which  grad- 
ually diminished after entry. High levels of Tagamet detailing occurred in mid- 
1980 and early 1983, apparently in response to Tagamet’s receiving FDA ap- 
proval for the new indications of  duodenal ulcer maintenance  (April 1980) 
and gastric ulcer therapy (December 1982). When Zantac entered with a very 
aggressive detailing effort in July  1983 (over 350,000 minutes), Tagamet re- 
sponded with about a 50 percent increase in its own detailing efforts. More 
detailing peaks for both Tagamet and Zantac occurred in 1986, a year in which 
Pepcid entered and Zantac obtained FDA approval for the treatment of GERD. 
Both Tagamet and Zantac appear to have anticipated the entry of Axid in April 
1988 by increasing their detailing in February 1988 (substantially by Tagamet, 
more modestly by Zantac), but both detailing levels declined again after Ax- 
id’s entry. 
Although month-to-month  variations  are apparent in figure 7.5, there are 
definite trends in the intense Zantac-Tagamet  detailing rivalry. As is seen in 
10. For  a discussion of  the possible  social-welfare impacts of  a pioneer raising its price in 
response to the introduction of a competitive product by a second entrant, see Perloff and Suslow 
(1994). Related literature is found in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990), Cocks (1975), Cocks and Virts 
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figure 7.6, where cumulative detailing minutes are plotted for all four products, 
over its entire life Tagamet has out-detailed Zantac. However, in terms of de- 
tailing minutes per year, Zantac has considerably outpaced Tagamet. In part, 
Zantac has been able to do this because it has had two sales forces, as a result 
of  Glaxo’s  comarketing  agreement  in  the  United  States  with  Hoffmann- 
LaRoche. In terms of cumulative minutes of detailing through the end of our 
sample, the relative magnitudes are as follows: for every one minute of Axid 
detailing, there have been 3.21 minutes of detailing by Tagamet, 2.60 minutes 
by  Zantac, and 0.88 minutes by Pepcid. 
According to Bond and Lean (1977), one way  in which pioneering advan- 
tages occur in the pharmaceutical industry is by the effectiveness of advertis- 
ing. Bond and Lean argue that to convince physicians to switch from an ex- 
isting drug to a new one and thereby to overcome advantages accruing to early 
entrants, the later entrant may be expected to offer either a lower price and/ 
or a heavier promotion.”  The Bond-Lean conjecture relates of course to the 
considerable theoretical and empirical literature in marketing and economics 
dealing  with  first-mover advantages.’* It is therefore of interest to examine 
whether this conjecture is consistent with the data from the H,-antagonist  drug 
market. Although we present econometric evidence on order-of-entry  effects 
in section 7.5, in figure 7.7 we display cumulative-detailing/cumulative-sales 
ratios  as a function of order of  entry after one, two, and three years in the 
marketplace. The results are striking. For these four products, given any dura- 
tion of time, cumulative detailing-sales ratios are always lowest for the pioneer 
(Tagamet), are always larger for the second entrant (Zantac), always increase 
further for the third entrant (Pepcid), and are always highest for the final en- 
trant (Axid). Moreover, since a disproportionate amount of  detailing occurs 
immediately following product launch, for all four H,-antagonist  products the 
cumulative detailing-sales ratios decrease as the time interval since launch in- 
creases. 
Detailing is not the only form of marketing rivalry, however. Another instru- 
ment for bringing product information to the attention of prescribing  physi- 
cians is medical journal advertising. It is worth mentioning that relative to de- 
tailing, estimated expenditures  on journal advertising are rather modest;  as 
observed earlier, expenditures on detailing are approximately four to five times 
as great as expenditures on journal advertising in the overall US.  pharmaceuti- 
cal industry, although substantial variations occur across products. 
It might be noted that to convert nominal to real dollars, one must employ a 
1  I. As Bond and Lean (1977, vi) state, “Neither heavy promotion nor low price appears to have 
been sufficient to persuade prescribing physicians to select in great volume the substitute brand of 
late entrants. . . . When other things are equal, physicians appear to prefer the brands of existing 
sellers to those of new sellers.” 
12. On first-mover advantages, see, e.g., the surveys and references in Kalyanaram and Urban 
(1992),  Robinson (1988),  Robinson and Fornell(1985), Robinson, Kalyanaram, and Urban (1994). 
Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), Schmalensee (1982), and Urban et al. (1986). For an altema- 
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deflator. We use the BLS price index for scientific and professional journals. 
Based on a preliminary  analysis of  advertising rates charged by  two major 
medical journals, the New England Journal of  Medicine and the Journal of 
the American Medical Association, however, we found that the BLS deflator 
appeared to rise less rapidly in the  1980s than did advertising rates in these 
journals. An alternative measure of real medical journal advertising involves a 
simple page count. This measure does not account well, of  course, for varia- 
tions in copy quality or in journal circulation. Later in this paper we discuss 
these two measures further. For our current purposes, it is sufficient to note 
that the two measures are reasonably highly correlated. In figure 7.8 we plot 
cumulative journal advertising dollars spent for each of the four H,-antagonist 
products, using the BLS deflator. Clearly the launch of Tagamet coincided with 
a considerable journal advertising campaign. Thereafter, until receiving FDA 
approval for duodenal ulcer maintenance in April 1980, Tagamet’s journal ad- 
vertising was relatively modest, with temporary increases around the time of 
FDA approval for gastric ulcer treatment (December  1982) and for GERD 
(March  1991). It is noteworthy that Tagamet’s journal advertising increased 
only moderately after the entry of  Zantac in August 1983, and it did not re- 
spond aggressively when Pepcid entered in late 1986. In terms of its response 
with journal advertising to entry by Pepcid and Axid, Zantac was roughly simi- 
lar to Tagamet. Spurts in Zantac’s journal advertising appear to follow closely 
the procurement of FDA approval for gastric ulcer treatment (June 1985), and 
the simultaneous approval for treatment of  duodenal ulcer maintenance  and 
GERD (May 1986). Finally, a comparison of figures 7.6 and 7.8 reveals that 
Pepcid and Axid differed considerably in their choice of marketing medium in 
the sense that Axid relied much more heavily than Pepcid on detailing and 
much less on medical journal advertising.” 
13. Industry sources say that this is true not only for Axid, but for all of Lilly’s products. Lilly’s 
corporate strategy has been to use a much higher percentage of detailing over journal advertising 
in their marketing efforts. Lilly’s mix of detailing to advertising is approximately 90 percent to 10 
percent, whereas the industry average is 75 percent to 25 percent. 50,000,000 
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With this overview of price, product quality, and marketing competition data 
trends in the H,-antagonist  market, we now turn our attention to modeling the 
growth in overall industry sales and to modeling changes in the shares earned 
by  the various products. We begin in section 7.4 with an analysis of overall 
industry growth and then consider market shares in section 7.5. 
7.4  Econometric Analysis of  Growth in Industry Sales 
In this paper we consider the four H,-antagonist  products as constituting a 
distinct  market  or industry. However,  since Tagamet and Zantac  so clearly 
dominate the H,-antagonist  market, we shall also consider a separate, simpler 
market-that  consisting only of Tagamet and Zantac. We first digress to con- 
sider theory and measurement issues and then present econometric results. 
7.4.1  Theoretical and Econometric Considerations 
The traditional approach to modeling demand for a product involves calling 
upon the economic theory of  consumer demand, in which consumers are as- 
sumed  to maximize  utility  given  prices  of  products  and an  overall  budget 
constraint; additional assumptions are then employed to aggregate up from the 
individual consumer to an overall industry demand. In the context of pharma- 
ceutical products, this approach is unlikely to be useful, for the typical decision 
maker (the physician) is not the consumer (the patient) who actually pays for 
the prescription drug product. Moreover the marginal price paid by the patient 
often differs considerably from the price received by the dispensing pharmacy, 
due to the existence of  third-party insurance and various copayment schemes. 
While a discussion of  such principal-agent problems is beyond the scope of 
this paper, we believe the existence of these institutional arrangements clearly 
suggests that rigid  adherence to the traditional  neoclassical approach of de- 
mand analysis is unlikely to be useful here. 
Although we eschew the direct use of conventional utility-maximizing eco- 
nomic behavior, we still wish to incorporate  the most important insights of 
demand analysis. Thus we specify that the quantity demanded depends on the 
price of the product, on product characteristics, and on marketing efforts. We 
now discuss these three factors affecting demand in further detail. 
In terms of price, economic theory suggests that the quantity demanded de- 
pends on real rather than nominal price; since we employ time-series data, we 
deflate average product price by the CPI. Also, although product-specific price 
data are available, for examining overall industry demand one must construct 
an industry price index. The important point here is that since we wish later on 
in this paper to investigate  the  extent of price-substitutability among drugs, 
when we construct an aggregate price index for the industry we must not im- 
plicitly  assume a value for such substitutability.  In  particular,  if  one simply 
summed up patient-days of therapy across drugs, then summed up total reve- 
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by total industry patient-days, one would implicitly be assuming that the vari- 
ous drugs are perfectly substitutable. To circumvent this problem, we employ 
the economic theory of price indexes and calculate the industry price using the 
Fisher-Ideal price index.  I4 
In terms of  quality, to the extent that product-quality characteristics affect 
the size of the potential market, they should be included in an overall industry 
demand equation. We would expect that the size of the potential patient market 
would depend on  the  specific indications for which  the FDA has  granted 
approval. We  shall concentrate on one particular  indication,  GERD, which 
represented an especially large potential new market, and for which the H,- 
antagonists first received FDA approval relatively late in the sample. Specifi- 
cally, when the FDA granted approval to Glaxo's Zantac for GERD, Zantac 
detailers were permitted to provide specific information to physicians concern- 
ing the treatment of GERD. This was significant, for instead of being confined 
to detailing to gastroenterologists who saw ulcer patients, now Zantac detailers 
also made calls on general practitioners who commonly saw patients having 
GERD symptoms. This undoubtedly expanded the potential market. 
Such reasoning  suggests that a dummy variable, say,  GERD (taking the 
value of  1 following FDA approval), be employed in the overall industry de- 
mand equation. However, it is worth noting that information concerning the 
efficacy of  drugs for different  indications typically diffuses prior to formal 
FDA approval. The medical community is often aware of results of clinical 
trials prior to the FDA's reviewing the clinical-trial data and coming to a final 
decision concerning approval for a new indication. As a result, a great deal of 
prescribing is done off-label prior to the FDA's granting approval. Thus, it is 
not clear how reliable the GERD dummy variable will be in capturing major 
changes in the size of the potential patient base. 
The third set of  factors affecting industry demand involves marketing ef- 
forts. Earlier we noted that, in this industry, the two principal forms of market- 
ing efforts are minutes of detailing and either pages or deflated dollars of medi- 
cal journal  advertising.  There  are  several  important issues  concerning the 
measurement of marketing efforts. First, since drug marketing is largely a mat- 
ter of providing information about the existence and usefulness of the product, 
we expect its impact to be long-lived; once a physician has been informed, it 
is hard to see how such information might be destroyed. Indeed, precisely be- 
cause of this durability, firms typically expend a particularly large amount of 
marketing effort in the early stages of a new product's life. Hence the impact 
of  marketing  on sales is likely better measured by  the cumulative stock of 
marketing efforts since product launch, rather than simply by the flow of cur- 
14. Specifically, the Fisher-Ideal  price  index is  the geometric  mean  of  the  Laspeyres  and 
Paasche price indexes, where each of  them is computed using updated weights. New products are 
incorporated as soon as is feasible (i.e., in the second period of  their existence, so that their first 
difference is calculated). For further details concerning the Fisher-Ideal price index, see Diewert 
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rent monthly expenditures. We  will also want to allow for the possibility that 
this stock of information depreciates or deteriorates over time, although we 
might expect the depreciation rate to be quite low. 
We therefore employ the well-known perpetual-inventory method. Let M,  be 
the stock of marketing effort at the end of month t (as measured by the stocks 
of journal advertising and detailing minutes), let 6 be the monthly rate of de- 
preciation of this stock, and let m, be the flow of marketing effort during time 
period t. Define M, as the depreciation-adjusted stock of marketing effort car- 
ried over from the last month (1 -  6)M,-, ,  plus new marketing efforts during 
months t (m,),  that is 
(1) 
We construct separate stock measures for detailing and for journal advertising. 
Unlike the typical case for capital-stock accounting, we have no problem wth 
establishing benchmark or “starting values” since we know that prior to August 
1977, the Tagamet journal  (and detailing) stocks were zero. To  implement 
equation (1 ), one must however assume rates of depreciation for each of these 
stocks. As discussed below, we  will use the historical data on marketing and 
sales to estimate 6 econometrically, rather than assume its value a priori. 
The other major issue in measuring the effects of marketing efforts entails 
an innovation of  this paper. Other authors have suggested that advertising be 
modeled as having two simultaneous effects in the market: overall advertising 
by all firms affecting overall market demand, and relative levels of advertising 
among firms affecting the individual firms’ market shares.I5  We take this mod- 
eling one step further here by  hypothesizing that firms may choose to direct 
their marketing efforts to emphasize one of the two effects more than the other. 
Although the degree to which firms’ marketing efforts are directed, say, at 
overall market expansion cannot be directly observed from data on quantities 
of  marketing done by  firms, we now propose a method for estimating this ef- 
fect econometrically. 
To clarify this concept, we discuss it in the context of  the antiulcer drug 
market. When  SmithKline marketed Tagamet from its introduction in  1977 
until the entry of Zantac in 1983, they did not worry about competing for mar- 
ket share in the H,-antagonist  market, for patent status conferred on them a 
temporary monopoly position. From this monopoly position, the goal of mar- 
keting for SmithKline was to convince more and more physicians of the utility 
of H,-antagonists in treating ulcer patients. They, and no other firm, reaped the 
rewards of having expended efforts on diffusing information on H,-antagonists 
to physicians, since they held 100 percent market share. However, once Zan- 
r 
M,  = (1 -  6)  MI-, + m, =  (1 -  a)‘-,  m,. 
T=  1 
15. See, for example, Schmalensee (1972). There is a considerable body of literature on a re- 
lated, but distinct, approach that decomposes advertising into its “information” and “persuasive” 
components. For examples in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, see Leffler (1981) and 
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tac entered the market, another marketing goal appeared: to preserve market 
share against Zantac among those doctors who had already adopted the H,- 
antagonist technology. Similarly, although Zantac detailers could benefit some- 
what from continuing to reach out to new doctors and patients still not con- 
verted to the H2-antagonist technology, Zantac detailers also had strong incen- 
tives  to  persuade  physicians  already  in  the  H,-antagonist  market  to  begin 
prescribing Zantac instead of Tagamet, emphasizing the alleged Zantac advan- 
tages of lower-frequency dosing and more-favorable  side-effect profiles. Un- 
like the monopoly case, in this duopoly situation the marketing efforts of firms 
may have both market-expanding and rivalrous (product-positioning) aspects. 
Moreover, to the extent that Zantac would reap some of the benefits of Taga- 
met’s  market-expanding  efforts  to  persuade  physicians  to  adopt  the  H,- 
antagonist drugs, and that Tagamet might  similarly benefit  somewhat from 
Zantac’s market-expanding promotions, each firm’s market-expanding promo- 
tional effort exerts a positive externality (spillover) on the other firm’s sales. 
Similarly, we might consider rivalrous  marketing to exert negative interfirm 
externalities. Furthermore, the magnitudes of both kinds of interfirm externali- 
ties should increase as the number of products on the market increases. There- 
fore, when the number of products in the market increases, ceteris paribus, we 
would expect a decrease in firms’ incentives to engage in market-expanding 
promotional efforts, and correspondingly greater incentives to engage in mar- 
keting with a more rivalrous content.I6  The practical implication of this hypoth- 
esis is that in a duopoly, ceteris paribus, one would expect the product market- 
ing of the two participants to have a smaller impact on industry demand than 
would be the case if this advertising had occurred in a monopoly market struc- 
ture, for some of  the duopolists’ advertising would primarily impact market 
share,  not  overall  industry  demand;  similarly,  ceteris  paribus,  for  a  given 
amount of cumulative marketing stocks, one might plausibly expect that in a 
triopoly  the effects of  marketing on industry demand would be less than in 
a duopoly. 
In this paper we examine this hypothesis empirically by infemng econome- 
trically the proportionate impact (relative to a monopoly) that marketing ef- 
forts have under varying market structures. To this end, we distinguish cumula- 
tive  marketing  efforts  according  to  the  market  structure  in  which  such 
expenditures originally occurred. Let M,,l  be the marketing stock at the end of 
month t that accumulated in the monopoly market environment, let M2,1  be the 
marketing  stock at the end of the month  t that accumulated  in the duopoly 
market environment, and let M,,  be the marketing stock at the end of month t 
that accumulated in a market environment consisting of K products. Define the 
16. This also implies that incentives to advertise, and perhaps the content of advertising mes- 
sages, can be expected to vary with industry structure. For further discussion of these issues, see 
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“effective industry-marketing” stock M,  as the weighted sum of the cumulative 
marketing efforts distinguished by market structure, that is, 
(2) 
where Mk,r,  k = 1, . . . ,  K, are each defined as in equation (1 ). Ceteris paribus, 
we therefore might plausibly expect that 
(3) 
reflecting the fact that in terms of affecting overall industry demand, partici- 
pants’ market-expanding effects decline as the number of products in the in- 
dustry increases.  l7 Since in a monopoly all marketing efforts affect industry 
demand, we normalize the kk’s  by setting Fl = 1. 
It is worth noting that two other hypotheses might be proposed involving the 
pk’s.  First, if the effects of firms’ marketing on industry sales are independent 
of market structure, then p2  = p3  = c~.~  = 1. Second and alternatively, if F~  = 
k3 = k4  = 0, then in the presence of any competition all marketing efforts are 
rivalrous and affect only market shares. Note that in such a case of possibly 
but  not  necessarily  socially  “wasteful”  marketing,  firms’  marketing  efforts 
generate a zero-sum change in industry sales. In our empirical analysis, we will 
estimate the remaining pk’s  in equation (2) and assess whether the evidence is 
consistent with any of these hypotheses. 
We begin with some definitions of  variables. Let Q, be total units of  sales 
for all products (a Fisher-Ideal quantity index), let PR, be the corresponding 
real price index (deflated by the CPI), let D,,  be the stock of minutes detailed 
by product k at the end of time period r, let Jk,,  be the stock of pages of advertis- 
ing in medical journals by  product k at time r, and let GERD, be the above- 
noted GERD dummy variable. 
In terms of a mathematical formulation, we specify a traditional  log-linear 
demand equation, where, however, the use of identities (1 ) and (2) necessitates 
estimation by nonlinear least squares (NLS) procedures. In particular, let 
M,  = cLP1.f cL2M2.f  + cL3M3.f + *  . ’  + cLkMk,l* 
cLI > cL2 > cL3 ’  . . . > cLk7 
where E  is an identically normally distributed random error term, and where 
lno,  and In?, are natural logarithms of the effective industry-marketing stocks 
of number of minutes detailed and pages of medical journal advertisements,18 
respectively, defined as 
17. Note that the p’s do not deal at all with the effects of marketing stocks on the market shares 
garnered by the various firms in the market. We discuss determinants of market shares further in 
section 7.5 below. 
18. Two possible measures of medical journal  advertising are current-dollar expenditures di- 
vided by a BLS price index for advertising in professional journals, and the number of pages of 
medical journal advertising. Results from preliminary regression estimation suggested that the 
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In turn, following equation (I), define the effective stock of minutes at the end 
of month t for a market structure consisting of K products as 
(7)  D,,  = (1 -  S,)Dk,l-l  + MIN,,,, 
where 6,  is the constant rate of  depreciation for the detailing-minutes stock, 
and MIN is the number of minutes detailed during month t, where month t was 
one in which the market structure consisted of k products. The construction of 
effective stocks of journal pages Jk,l  by type of market structure is analogous 
to that in equation (7). Since equations (4)-(7)  are nonlinear in the k’s and 
6’s, for convenience we will constrain IJ.~  = IJ.;,  and S,,,  = S), but of course the 
IJ.~  (equal for minutes and journal pages) will still be permitted to differ with 
industry  structure k in order that the hypothesized inequality in equation (1) 
might emerge. 
There is one other issue that merits  attention. At  the  industry level,  one 
would expect price to be simultaneously determined with quantity. Moreover, 
as has been emphasized by,  among others, Dorfman and Steiner (1954) and 
Schmalensee (1972), advertising efforts are also likely to be jointly determined 
with price and quantity. In terms of stochastic specification, therefore, it may 
well be the case that lnPR, lnz, and ln? are correlated with  E, in which case 
NLS estimation would provide inconsistent estimates of the parameters. In the 
next section, we therefore report results of  a Hausman test for this possible 
endogeneity, and since we find the correlation to be significant, we also esti- 
mate  and  report  results  using  the  nonlinear  two-stage  least  squares  (NL- 
2SLS) estimator. 
7.4.2  Results of Econometric Analysis 
Our data set consists of 189 monthly observations beginning in September 
1977. We proceed using two alternative definitions of the market, one compris- 
ing the two dominant products, Zantac and Tagamet, and the other comprising 
all four H,-antagonists.  In each case, we begin by setting the depreciation rate 
6 = 0; we then examine and choose among several possible alternative speci- 
fications. Given reasonable regression equations, we perform a grid search for 
the best-fit value of S by re-estimating the models assuming a variety of depre- 
ciation rates, where 0 5  6 5  1. We choose as our final set of parameter esti- 
mates the values of S and the other parameters for which the sum of  squared 
residuals is minimized  (the sample likelihood  function is maximized).  Our 
findings are summarized in table 7.1; the first two columns are estimates for 
the two-product market,  while the last two columns are for the four-product 
market. 301  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
Table 7.1  Parameter Estimates in the Two- and Four-Product Industry Models 
InQ, =  Po + P,  lnPR, + P2  lno, + P,ln?, + P,GERD, + E,, where 
- 
D, = D,,  + @,, + p.,D,, + 
7, = J,,  + c2J,,  + I.L,J,,  + 
+ p.,D,,, where 
D,, = (I - s)D,,  , + MIN, ,,  and 
+ p,J,,, where 
J,  ~  = (1 -  6)J,,  , + PJL,, 
NLS  NL-2SLS  NLS  NL-2SLS 
T-2  T-Z  T-Z-P-A  T-2-P-A 
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Notes; T-Z stands for Tagamet-Zantac. T-Z-P-A stands for Tagamet-Zantac-Pepcid-Axid.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
First, as seen in column (1 ) of  table 7.1,  the iterative NLS procedure yields 
an optimum when 6 is very small (0.2 percent per month) and is not signifi- 
cantly different from zero.I9 While we expected a low value for this deprecia- 
tion rate since knowledge and information about a product is very durable, that 
we obtained such a very low rate of depreciation is somewhat surprising. It is 
worth noting, however, that in an interindustry productivity  study estimating 
the depreciation  rate of  research  and development  (R&D)  capital  (another 
good whose use involves potential spillovers and for which information plays 
19. The implicit standard error estimates in  table 7.1 are conditional on the value of 6. The t- 
statistic for 6 was computed by comparing the likelihood function at 6 = 0 with that at 6 = 0.0020, 
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a central role), Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) reported an estimated depre- 
ciation rate of zero. 
Second, the estimate of F~  is about 0.69, and with a standard error estimate 
of about 0.07, it is significantly different both from unity and from zero. Since 
k, has been normalized to unity, this estimate of k3  implies that, ceteris pari- 
bus, observed marketing stocks of detailing minutes and journal pages are only 
about 70 percent as effective in changing industry sales when they occur in a 
duopoly (Tagamet and Zantac), relative to when they take place in a monopoly 
(Tagamet). This is a plausible result, for anecdotal evidence suggests to us that 
much of the Zantac-Tagamet duopoly was characterized by highly competitive 
marketing, aimed at securing market share rather than focused on increasing 
overall industry growth.?O Nonetheless, as was shown in figure 7.1, during this 
duopoly industry sales grew rapidly. 
Third, in terms of marketing effectiveness, as is seen in column (1  ) of table 
7.1, the elasticity of sales with respect to effective cumulative industry detail- 
ing minutes (1nD) is slightly greater than 0.5, which is about two and one-half 
times as large as the elasticity for effective cumulative industry journal pages 
(InJ), whose value is about 0.2. Fourth, each of these two marketing elasticit- 
ies is estimated to be considerably smaller in absolute magnitude than the mar- 
ket-price elasticity, which is slightly less than unity (-0.90).  Finally, although 
we have some hesitations concerning its reliability in tracking physician aware- 
ness, the coefficient on GERD (a dummy variable equal to 1 during the time 
period in which the FDA approved an H,-antagonist drug for the GERD indica- 
tion) is positive and significant; the estimate implies that, ceteris paribus, FDA 
approval for GERD increased the market size by about 15 percent. 
These NLS results are based on the assumption that the regressors are uncor- 
related  with the disturbance term (in our context, that the regressors are all 
exogenous). We have tested for this assumption using a Hausman specification 
test, using instruments that will be discussed below. We find that the joint null 
hypothesis of no correlation between F and lnPR, F  and lnD, and E  and InJ is 
soundly rejected:*’  the likelihood-ratio test statistic is 49.2, while the 0.01 criti- 
cal value for the five restrictions is  15.1.22  This implies that NLS generates 
inconsistent parameter estimates and suggests that we instead employ the NL- 
2SLS estimator. 
We utilize two groups of exogenous variables to form the instruments. One 
group is common to both firms: the log of the producer price index for interme- 
diate materials, the log of the wage rate for production workers in the pharma- 
20. For a journalistk  account of Glaxo’s marketing activities and their success in the market- 
place, see Lynn (1991). 
21. More precisely, the null hypothesis involves testing that the various component (monopoly, 
duopoly) stocks of MIN and PJL are uncorrelated with E. Hence under the alternative hypothesis 
there are five endogenous variables, monopoly qtocks of  MIN and PJL, duopoly stocks of MIN 
and PJL, and price. 
22. Coefficients on each of the marketing-stock variables, and on the price variable, were sig- 
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ceutical industry, the GERD dummy variable,  and a time counter. The other 
set incorporates firm-specific  variations  but  aggregates them to the industry 
level: the number of detailing minutes by  firms for their products other than 
those in the H,-antagonist  market and the number of real dollars of medical 
journal advertisements  for the  firms’  non-H,-antagonist  products.  To  make 
these variables comparable to the components of  the regressors  1nD and 1nJ 
(see equations [5]  and [6]  above), we construct stocks separately by type of 
industry structure and then cumulate them assuming 6 = 0. 
The results of the NL-2SLS estimation are presented in column (2) of table 
7.1. Relative to the NLS findings, a number of results are worth noting. First, 
with NL-2SLS the criterion function is optimized when 6 = 0. This estimate 
is low, but as noted above, it is not  without precedent  in a related  context. 
Second, under NL-2SLS estimation, the estimate of  IJ.,  increases from 0.69 to 
about 0.89 and is now no longer significantly different from unity. It is, how- 
ever, significantly different from zero. Third, the price-elasticity estimate under 
NL-2SLS  is  slightly  larger  in  absolute  value  (-1.07  vs.  -0.90),  but  the 
detailing-minutes elasticity is smaller (0.41 vs. 0.53). Fourth, for the journal- 
page elasticity, under NL-2SLS estimation the estimate increases from 0.2 1 to 
0.28. Hence with NL-2SLS as well as with NLS estimation, the estimates of 
the journal-page  and detailing-minutes elasticities are much smaller in abso- 
lute value than is the price elasticity. Finally, under either estimation method, 
R2  is above .99, and the Durbin-Watson test statistics are very close to 2.0. 
We now turn to a discussion of findings obtained under a four-product mar- 
ket definition; results are given in columns (3)  and (4)  of table 7. l.  As shown 
in the table, under either estimation method the goodness of  fit is above .99, 
and the Durbin-Watson test statistic is again quite close to 2.0. For both NLS 
and NL-2SLS, the estimated 6 at the optimum was 0.00. Hence the very low 
depreciation  estimate results  for marketing efforts of  detailing minutes and 
pages of medical journals carries over from the two-product to the four-product 
market context. Also, the Hausman test for exogeneity is again clearly rejected, 
although not as decisively as in the two-product analysis; here the likelihood- 
ratio test statistic is 41.3, while the 0.01 critical value for the nine restrictions 
is 21.7. This suggests again that the NLS estimates may be inconsistent and 
that we should instead employ the NL-2SLS estimator. 
The NL-2SLS estimate for the market-price elasticity in this four-product 
market  is slightly smaller (in absolute value) than in the two-product  case, 
around -0.74  versus -  1.07. The estimate of the sales elasticity with respect 
to cumulative detailing minutes is somewhat larger here (0.57 vs. 0.41), while 
that with respect to journal pages is slightly smaller (0.17 vs. 0.28). Moreover, 
with  the  larger  four-firm  market  definition  the  GERD coefficient declines 
slightly, from about 16  percent to 12 percent. 
Of particular interest, however, are the estimates of k2,  k3,  and k4.  Recall 
from the discussion surrounding equation (3)  that we hypothesized that, ceteris 
paribus,  1 > k2  > k3  > k4.  As is seen in the last two columns of table 7.1, 304  E. R. Berndt, L. T.  Bui, D. H. Lucking-Reiley, and G.  L. Urban 
this pattern is largely, but not completely, borne out; although less than unity, 
typical estimates of these three parameters are 0.6, 0.8, and 0.5, respectively. 
Why it is that marketing efforts in the triopoly epoch were more effective in 
generating industry sales than during the two- and four-product eras is an issue 
meriting further examination. Moreover, the joint null hypothesis that these k’s 
are all unity (that the effectiveness of marketing efforts on sales is independent 
of market structure) is decisively rejected, as is the joint hypothesis that k2  = 
k3  = p4 = 0, the latter  indicating  that  market-expansion  spillovers do not 
entirely disappear when competition begins. While these spillovers are consid- 
erably lower in the duopoly period than would be the case in a monopoly and 
are lower when there are four products on the market than when there are two, 
in this market the relationship between  kk  and the number of products in the 
market is not completely monotonic. 
7.5  Econometric Analysis of Factors Affecting Market Shares 
Up to this point our analysis has focused on overall market demand, with 
alternative definitions of the market. We now report on an exploratory effort at 
modeling the factors that affect individual market shares earned by each of the 
products. The results reported here are those from our initial research; we in- 
tend to extend this analysis in future research. As in section 7.4, we begin with 
a discussion of considerations drawn from economic theory and then report on 
statistical findings. 
7.5.1  Theoretical and Econometric Considerations 
The specification of  market-share or relative demand functions traditionally 
draws on the economic theory of consumer behavior. As noted earlier, however, 
principal-agent  problems  and wedges between  marginal  relative prices paid 
and  received  imply  that  one cannot directly  employ  the  economic theory 
framework  of  consumers  maximizing  utility  given  prices  and  budget  con- 
straints. 
Consistent with traditional economic specifications, however, we would ex- 
pect that relative rather than level prices affect market shares. Moreover, within 
the marketing literature, there is ample precedent for specifying that relative 
values (ratios) of product characteristics, and relative marketing efforts, affect 
market shares. In addition, both the economic and marketing literatures sug- 
gest that order of entry can be expected to be a significant determinant of mar- 
ket shares (see, e.g., Schmalensee 1982; Kalyanaram  and Urban  1992; and 
Urban et al. 1986). Following Urban et al. (1986), we employ a market-share 
specification of the general form 305  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
where Q,,/Q,, is the sales of productj relative to product 1 (the first or pioneer 
entrant, in this case, Tagamet) in month t,  P,,lP,, are the corresponding relative 
prices per day of therapy, MINJMIN,,  and PJL,,/PJL,, are relative cumulative 
stocks of minutes of product detailing and cumulative pages of medical journal 
advertisements (defined as in eq. [  1 1, Ys,  are a set of s  variables measuring the 
quality of productj relative to the pioneer (e.g., dosage frequency, number of 
[adverse] drug interactions  reported  to  the  FDA,  whether  product j has  a 
GERD-indication advantage relative to the pioneer, etc.), and ENT,, is the or- 
der of entry of product j (i.e., 2 for Zantac, 3 for Pepcid, and 4 for Axid). 
In our context, the pioneer product is Tagamet, and thus all variables in equa- 
tion (8) are measured for productj relative to Tagamet. Since market share is 
100 percent for Tagamet during its monopoly epoch (September  1977-July 
1983), the data set for which market-share analysis is appropriate commences 
in August  1983; data prior to this are not employed. In the  case of  a two- 
product market definition, the data therefore consist of Zantac-Tagamet relative 
quantities beginning with August  1983, a total of  11  8 observations. For the 
four-product  (H,-antagonist)  market definition,  however, the data set is ex- 
panded to incorporate relative Pepcid-Tagamet  data points (December 1986 
onward), as well as relative Axid-Tagamet observations (beginning with June 
1988), giving us a total  of 255  observations. Note that in this four-product 
model the data take the form of an unbalanced panel. 
Finally, in terms of econometric considerations, one would expect that rela- 
tive market shares, relative marketing efforts, and relative prices are jointly 
determined. For this reason, we compare the ordinary least squares (OLS) and 
NLS results with those based on 2SLS and NL-2SLS. 
In terms of mathematical formulation, we specify a relative demand equa- 
tion as in equation (8),  where variables are logarithmically transformed: 
where ENTRY,, takes on the value 2 for all Zantac observations, 3 for Pepcid, 
and 4 for Axid; FREQ,, is the recommended daily dosage frequency of drug  j; 
INT,, is the number of (adverse) drug interactions of  drug j reported to the 
FDA as of time t;23  DGERD,, is a variable indicating whether product j has a 
GERD-indication advantage relative to Tagamet (1 if an advantage, zero if no 
advantage, -  1 if a disadvantage); and AGE,, is the number of months product 
j has been in the marketplace. Notice that if the relative price, relative detailing 
minutes, relative adverse interaction, and relative dosing frequency variables 
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were all unity, and if the products had no GERD advantage, then at age zero, 
the relative quantities would depend solely on the order-of-entry effects. Thus 
the coefficient on ENTRY reflects disadvantages confronting later entrants into 
the market, other things held equal. The coefficient on AGE reflects the impact 
of  marketplace  experience  on  sales, holding  ENTRY (and other variables) 
fixed. A priori, we expect that p, < 0, p2 < 0, p,  > 0, p,  > 0, p,  < 0, p,  < 
0, and p, > 0.24 
As noted earlier, the data set for this market-share model begins when the 
Tagamet monopoly period ends and Zantac enters. To implement the model 
empirically, we must make an assumption concerning the “starting value” of 
the Tagamet stock of detailing minutes. Since the results of our industry analy- 
sis suggested that depreciation rates for effective industry-marketing  stocks 
were  zero, we begin  the duopoly era using Tagamet’s end-of-monopoly-era 
value for MIN,, assuming 6 = 0. However, we will permit 6, the depreciation 
rate for these stocks, to differ from zero now that competition has emerged, 
reflecting in part the fact that the content of marketing may now become more 
susceptible to counterclaims and therefore become less long-lived. Although 
we have not yet developed a formal model describing optimal behavior in this 
context, we would not be surprised if the depreciation rate, 6, in the rivalrous 
context were larger than it was in the industry-expanding environment. 
7.5.2  Results of Econometric Analysis 
We begin with a market-share analysis for the two-product market, Tagamet 
and Zantac. Conditional on any given rate of  depreciation, the market-share 
model of  equation (9) is linear in the parameters. We proceed by  estimating 
parameters in equation (9) by  OLS under different rates of depreciation and 
then choose as our preferred model that set of 6 and the other parameters that 
minimizes  the  sum of  squared residuals  (maximizes the  sample  likelihood 
function). Results from preliminary analysis suggested that it was difficult to 
obtain precise estimates of both marketing instruments-minutes  of detailing 
and pages of medical journal advertising-reflecting  in part the fact that the 
simple correlation between MIN,,/MIN,, and PJLJPJL,,  was .98. In the results 
presented in table 7.2,  the lnPJL variable was therefore deleted. Several points 
are worth noting. 
First, in the two-product  industry equation, the likelihood function is max- 
imized at the point where 6 = 0. A second, somewhat unexpected, result is 
that the coefficient on the relative frequency of dosage variable (InRFRQ, = 
In(FREQ,,/FREQ,,)),  though negative,  is insignificantly  different from zero. 
We therefore set this parameter to zero and re-estimate the model. As is seen 
in column (2)  of table 7.2, the logarithm of the relative quantities of Zantac to 
24. Note that if one insisted, this logarithmic functional form could be rationalized as deriving 
from the relative demand equations based on a constant elasticity of  substitution (CES) indirect 
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Table 7.2  Parameter Estimates in the Two- and Four-Product Market-Share 
OLS  OLS  2SLS 
T-Z  T-Z  T-Z 



































































OLS  2SLS 
T-Z-P-A  T-2-P-A 
(5)  (6) 
-0.492*  -0.507* 
(0.01)  (0.01) 
(0.06)  (0.07) 
0.73  1  *  0.673* 
(0.02)  (0.04) 
0.032  0.046* 
(0.02)  (0.02) 
-0.643*  -0.693* 
-C.099*  -0.251* 
(0.04)  (0.02) 
0.011*  0.012* 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
0.000  0.039* 
(0.00) 
0.993  0.990 









Notes: T-Z stands for Tagamet-Zantac. T-Z-P-A stands for Tagamet-Zantac-Pepcid-Axis.  Standard 
errors are reported in parentheses. 
*Significant at the 95 percent level. 
Tagamet (In( Q,,/Qlf), the  dependent  variable) is significantly  negatively  af- 
fected  by  relative  price  (1nRPR = In( P,,/P,,))-the  own-price  elasticity is 
about -0.8  and is very substantially affected by the relative stocks of cumula- 
tive detailing minutes (1nRMIN = ln(MIN,,/MINl,)), which have an elastic- 
ity  estimate  of  about  1.0. As hypothesized,  the  coefficient  on the  GERD- 
advantage variable  is positive  (0.08) and  significant,  while that on lnRINT 
= In[(INT,, + l)/(INT,, + l)], where INT is the number of (adverse) drug 
interactions reported to the FDA, is negative (-0.09)  and significant. Finally, 
while the order-of-entry coefficient (in this two-product model, essentially just 
the intercept term) is negative, its standard error is quite large. By contrast, the 
coefficient on the AGE variable is positive and highly significant. 
We then perform a Hausman test to check for possible endogeneity of lnRPR 
and 1nRMIN. The exogenous variables used here are the same as those noted 
in section 7.4 above, except now the firm-specific number of detailing minutes 308  E. R. Berndt, L. T.  Bui, D. H. Lucking-Reiley, and G. L. Urban 
and dollars of medical journal advertising for products other than those in the 
H,-antdgonist  market are employed, as are dummy variables for whether the 
product has received FDA approval for duodenal maintenance therapy, gastric 
ulcers, GERD and stress ulcer prevention. These latter variables are particu- 
larly useful as instruments, since they represent “shocks” and new information 
for marketing efforts. The results of the Hausman test are not as clear as in the 
overall market analysis; here the likelihood-ratio test for exogeneity of lnRPR 
and lnRMIN is 6.67, while the 0.01 chi-square critical value for the two restric- 
tions is 6.63. As a sensitivity check, we proceed with 2SLS estimation. Our 
2SLS results are presented in columns (3) and (4) of table 7.2. 
With 2SLS estimation, the fitting optimum is again reached with the depre- 
ciation rate 6 = 0. Essentially, the results are the same as those obtained under 
OLS estimation. In particular, the own-price elasticity estimate is about -0.9, 
about the same in absolute value as the elasticity of sales with respect to cumu- 
lative detailing. The DGERD advantage is significant and equal to about 10 
percent, AGE is significant and about 1 percent per month, while both ENTRY 
and lnRFRQ are negative but insignificantly different from zero. Finally, Zan- 
tac’s relative market share is significantly negatively affected by its number of 
drug interactions relative to Tagamet. At the end of the sample, incidentally, 
values of INT are  12 for Tagamet and  1 for Zantac. Hence, the INT product- 
quality variable is particularly important in explaining the growth in Zantac’s 
market share and the corresponding decline of Tagamet. 
In summary, in the two-product market, relative Zantac-Tagamet quantities 
demanded are systematically related to relative product prices, relative cumu- 
lative detailing efforts, relative product quality (relative adverse interactions 
and GERD, but not, apparently, dosing frequency), and the length of time the 
product has been on the market. Moreover, for both OLS and 2SLS estimation, 
the goodness of fit is above .99.25 
We  now turn to the broader market definition,  one encompassing all four 
H,-antagonist  products (Tagamet, Zantac, Pepcid, and Axid). The results  of 
this analysis are given in the last two columns of  table 7.2. First, we now un- 
cover evidence suggesting that in the rivalrous-market  context, depreciation 
rates  on detailing  minutes  differ  substantially from zero.  Specifically, with 
OLS estimation, the sample log-likelihood function is maximized when 6 = 
0.039; this monthly rate of  3.9 percent corresponds  with  an  annual rate of 
about 38 percent. Second, with this expanded market definition, order-of-entry 
effects (no longer just an intercept term) become very large and significant; the 
-0.492  estimate corresponds with about a 39 percent disadvantage accruing to 
each later entrant, ceteris paribus, and is remarkably close to the “consensus” 
estimate of order-of-entry effects ( -0.5) in numerous other markets surveyed 
by  Robinson,  Kalyanaram,  and  Urban  (1994). Third,  although  the  price- 
25. Durbin-Watson test statistics in the two OLS equations are 1.646 and  1.624, while in the 
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elasticity estimate is slightly smaller in absolute value in this four-firm market 
than in the two-firm context (-0.7  vs -0.9),  the standard error estimates are 
much smaller, and the t-statistics are therefore larger. Further, the elasticity of 
relative sales with respect to relative cumulative detailing minutes is slightly 
larger in absolute value than the price elasticity (0.73 vs. -0.64)  and is also 
highly significant. Finally, as hypothesized, the coefficient on the variable for 
relative number of (adverse) drug interactions (1nRINT) is negative and sig- 
nificant (-0.25,  t-statistic  of  12), and the coefficient on DGERD is positive 
(0.03), but the latter coefficient is of only marginal statistical significance (t- 
statistic of 1.9).  The AGE coefficient is again slightly greater than 1 percent, 
indicating that length of time in the marketplace affects relative sales in a posi- 
tive manner. Goodness of fit is again about .99.26 
To check on the possible endogeneity of relative prices and relative detailing 
stocks, we again perform a Hausman specification test. The null hypothesis of 
exogeneity of lnRPR and InRMIN is decisively rejected; the likelihood-ratio 
test statistic is 8.53, while the 0.01 chi-square critical value for the two restric- 
tions is 6.63. 
Parameter estimates under 2SLS estimation are given in column (6)  of table 
7.2. Several findings are of particular interest. First, the estimate of  6 at the 
fitting optimum is 0.042 and is significantly different from zero; this monthly 
depreciation rate of 4.2 percent  implies an annual rate of  about 40 percent. 
Hence, these results suggest that in the four-product antiulcer market, relative 
detailing efforts have a long-lived  rivalrous impact that depreciates at about 
40 percent per year. Second, order-of-entry effects  are very  substantial and 
statistically significant (-0.5 1, t-statistic  of 59), and they again conform re- 
markably closely to the -0.5  consensus estimate reported by Robinson, Kalya- 
naram, and Urban (1994) for numerous other packaged-goods markets. Third, 
the absolute  values  of  the price and advertising elasticities are roughly  the 
same, 0.7, and each is significantly different from zero. Thus the evidence sug- 
gests that in the four-firm market, relative shares garnered by the four products 
vary systematically and significantly  with  order of  entry, relative price, and 
relative  cumulative detailing minutes. In terms of product-quality  variables, 
increases in the relative number of adverse drug interactions reported to the 
FDA negatively  impact relative sales, whereas having a GERD-approval ad- 
vantage relative to Tagamet positively affects relative sales. 
In  summary, this exploratory four-firm market-share analysis suggests that 
order of entry, pricing behavior, marketing behavior, and product  quality all 
affect relative sales quantities in the hypothesized manner. Moreover, rivalrous 
detailing appears to depreciate at about 40 percent per year. 
Before leaving this discussion, however, we believe it is of interest to report 
estimates of total price elasticities. The price elasticity estimates reported in 
26. Since the data set now consists of an unbalanced panel, the traditional Durbin-Watson test 
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table 7.2 focus only on relative quantities (market shares), but leave fixed the 
size of total industry demand at, say, a;  denote these price elasticities by  e:. 
A total-price elasticity also captures the impact of a product’s price change on 
total industry demand; denote such a price elasticity  by  eJJ (no asterisk). As 
has been shown by, inter alia, Berndt and Wood (1979), the relationship be- 
tween e:  and eJJ  is as follows: 
where QJ is the quantity demanded of  product j, Q is total industry demand, 
and P is industry price. The first partial derivative  in equation  (10) can be 
assumed to equal unity (other things being equal, demand for product j grows 
equiproportionally with market demand, i.e., according to its market share), 
while the second partial derivative is the industry- or market-price elasticity 
(estimated values of  which are given in table 7.1). The last partial derivative 
in equation (10) indicates the impact of  a change in product j’s price on the 
overall industry price index; it can be approximated by  the revenue share of 
product j  in total industry revenues. 
Alternative OLS and 2SLS estimates of e/T  are given in table 7.2, while NLS 
and NL-2SLS estimates of the industry-price elasticity are presented in table 
7.1. For the two-product  market,  1993 drugstore revenue shares for Tagamet 
and Zantac  are  approximately  0.25 and 0.75. For the  four-product  market, 
these shares are approximately 0.19 (Tagamet), 0.60 (Zantac), 0.12 (Pepcid), 
and 0.09 (Axid). Together, these relationships imply that in the two-product 
context, the 2SLS estimates of the total own-price demand elasticities for Taga- 
met and Zantac are approximately -  1.154 and -  1.690, respectively, while in 
the four-product market, the 2SLS estimated total own-price demand elasticity 
is  -0.909  for Tagamet, -1.153  for Zantac,  -0.820  for Pepcid, and  -0.799 
for Axid. Note that while these point estimates imply that some of the demand 
elasticities are less than  one in absolute magnitude, the  associated standard 
errors may well imply that reasonable confidence intervals include values of 
one and above (in absolute value). 
7.6  Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we  have attempted to explain the phenomenal growth of the 
H,-antagonist  antiulcer drug industry in the United States, as well as changes 
in the market shares garnered by  the various products over time. Although we 
have examined the roles of product quality, order of entry, and price, we have 
focused  particular  attention  on  the  role  of  various  marketing  efforts.  Our 
framework and results can be summarized as follows. 
First, marketing efforts such as detailing and medical journal advertising 
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cumulative detailing or cumulative medical journal advertising is a more ap- 
propriate  measure  of  marketing  impacts than  are current  monthly  expendi- 
tures. In the context of industry demand, we distinguish investments of firms 
in these marketing activities by the industry structure prevailing when the ex- 
penditures originally occurred. In a monopoly market structure, all marketing 
expenditures are market-expanding, for the monopolist has 100 percent market 
share. In a market structure with k products, however, marketing activities be- 
come more rivalrous, and as k becomes large, we expect relatively little “spill- 
over” of a firm’s marketing efforts in affecting industry demand. We have hy- 
pothesized, therefore, that in terms of affecting industry demand, the relative 
effects of marketing expenditures originally made when k products were in the 
market will tend to decline as k increases. In other words, we hypothesize that 
the effectiveness of marketing in generating industry sales depends on market 
structure in a systematic manner. 
In our empirical analysis of the antiulcer drug market, we obtained consider- 
able but not quite unanimous  support for this hypothesis. In particular, nor- 
malizing the impact of a monopolist’s marketing investments on current sales 
to unity, we estimated the impact in a duopoly to be 0.6, in a three-product 
industry  to be 0.8, and in  a four-product  market  to be 0.5; these  last three 
numbers are all statistically significantly different from unity (implying that 
we reject the hypothesis that the effectiveness of marketing efforts is indepen- 
dent of market structure), and from zero (indicating that we reject the hypothe- 
sis that once there is competition, the only impact of marketing is on market 
share, and there is none on overall market size). Thus our results suggest that 
in the antiulcer drug market there is clear evidence of spillovers, and that these 
spillovers are considerably less than  100 percent effective. Moreover, for the 
most part, these spillovers decline as the number of products in the industry in- 
creases. 
Second, we find that at the industry level, both cumulative minutes of detail- 
ing and cumulative pages of medical journal advertising affect sales; typical 
estimates of these elasticities are 0.5 and 0.2, respectively. At the market-share 
level, relative sales of products are also positively related to relative cumulative 
minutes of detailing; this elasticity is typically in the range of 0.7 to 0.9. To- 
gether these results imply that the marketing efforts of firms in the antiulcer 
drug market had substantial effects, in terms of affecting both market shares 
and the size of the overall industry. 
Third,  a somewhat unexpected  result  we obtained is that  at the  industry 
level, the rate of depreciation of stocks of both minutes of detailing and medi- 
cal journal advertising was estimated to be zero. We believe  that this result 
reflects the fact that market-expanding marketing primarily involves informing 
physicians about the usefulness of this class of drugs, and that once a physician 
begins  prescribing  these drugs, he or she is not likely to forget about their 
existence and stop prescribing them. By contrast, at the level of market shares 
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(Tagamet, Zantac, Pepcid, and Axid), we find that the market-share impact of 
the stock of detailing minutes deteriorated at an annual rate of around 40 per- 
cent, reflecting perhaps a more rivalrous content of marketing efforts. 
The remarkable growth in the market share of Zantac over time can be par- 
tially explained, then, by the very substantial marketing efforts undertaken by 
Glaxo. However, pricing policies also had an impact. Zantac gained share over 
Tagamet in part because the price premium commanded by Zantac declined 
from about 56 percent in  1983 to only 25 percent in  1993. Our estimates of 
industry-price elasticities range from about -0.7  to -0.9,  while estimates of 
cross-price elasticities between any pair of the four products are about 0.7. 
Another set of important factors affecting sales of antiulcer drugs concerns 
product-quality attributes. At the industry level, the evidence suggests that the 
size of the market was enlarged considerably when the FDA granted approval 
for the GERD indication-a  condition that occurs in a relatively large popula- 
tion. At the  market-share  level, we find that when  a product had  a GERD- 
approval advantage relative to other products, its market share increased. Thus 
another reason why Zantac fared so well in the marketplace is that for quite 
some time it was the  only product that had received  FDA approval for the 
treatment of GERD. Another variable affecting market share significantly is 
the number of adverse interactions with other drugs reported to the FDA. On 
this account Tagamet fared relatively badly (by 1993, Tagamet had twelve drug 
interactions, Zantac and Axid had only one, and Pepcid had none). Thus Zan- 
tac also enjoyed advantages from this product-quality characteristic. An unex- 
pected result we obtained, however, was that dosing frequency did not appear 
to affect market shares in a statistically significant manner. 
Finally, we found that, as in many other markets, order-of-entry effects are 
very substantial. In particular, holding constant price, marketing efforts, and 
product quality relative to the nth product, the (n  + 1)th entrant can expect 
about forty percent lower sales. 
The results of this paper are of considerable interest in the current health- 
care reform debate. Critics of the pharmaceutical  industry  have argued that 
much detailing is merely aimed at market share and is socially wasteful. Some 
have suggested placing ceilings on the marketing activities of pharmaceutical 
firms, but our findings demonstrate that this could have negative social welfare 
impacts. The findings in this paper suggest that marketing efforts also play a 
very important role in the diffusion of information to physicians, although the 
degree to which this is true probably declines somewhat as the number of prod- 
ucts in a market increases. Moreover, our results suggest that in order to over- 
come pioneer-product  advantages, later entrants have found  it necessary  to 
advertise more intensively. An implication of these results is that if all pharma- 
ceutical firms were constrained in their marketing activities, it is possible that 
the benefits would accrue primarily to the pioneer firms, at the expense of later 
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vantages. Thus, such a policy could have anticompetitive impacts, although it 
would be consistent with a patent system that rewards innovation. 
The research reported in this paper should be extended in a number of ways. 
First, although the industry and market-share equations are plausible and pro- 
vide important initial evidence on the roles of marketing, price, and product- 
quality competition in the antiulcer market, the underlying models could be 
modified  in a number of useful ways. The most obvious extension is to re- 
formulate the models within an explicitly dynamic diffusion framework, such 
as those  involving  the  Gompertz,  logistic, or other more general  diffusion- 
curve formulations. In such a framework, marketing and pricing policies might 
not only affect the long-run or equilibrium level of demand, but they might 
also affect the speed at which a long-run equilibrium level is approached. 
As second useful extension would involve incorporating data on direct-to- 
consumer  marketing.  In  1988  SmithKline  experimented  with  a  “Tommy 
Tummy” television advertising campaign that was aimed directly at consumers 
but did not mention Tagamet by name. More recently, Glaxo has advertised in 
magazines and on television, suggesting that patients with heartburn and acid 
discomfort should see their physicians. These ads are sponsored by the Glaxo 
Research Institute and, consistent with FDA regulations on direct-to-consumer 
advertising, do not mention the Zantac product by  name unless the requisite 
warning and other product information is also fully disclosed. Since these ad- 
vertisements typically do not mention products’ names, their impact is more 
likely to be on industry demand than on market share. Moreover, direct-to- 
consumer advertising may change the physician-patient information-sharing 
relationship,  and therefore  could modify  the diffusion process. It would be 
useful to examine whether such effects have actually occurred, and by exten- 
sion, how effective is direct-to-consumer  marketing in the antiulcer market- 
place. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the findings of this paper suggest inter- 
esting topics in the theory of industrial organization. What is the optimal mar- 
keting strategy for firms when there are spillovers and marketing activities have 
long-lived  impacts? What  is the correspondingly  optimal pricing behavior? 
How does this optimal behavior vary with market structure? How is the opti- 
mal behavior affected by federal tax provisions that allow the expensing (rather 
than amortizing) of long-lived marketing investments? What are the implica- 
tions for social welfare? 
Obviously,  much remains  to be  done. We  believe  we have demonstrated 
quite clearly that marketing efforts are very important in understanding the 
diffusion and economic success of new products. Product quality and pricing 
behavior have also been shown to play important roles in the diffusion process. 
We hope the results of this paper contribute to this and other related research 
projects that enrich our understanding of the economics of  new products. 314  E. R. Berndt, L. T.  Bui, D. H. Lucking-Reiley, and G.  L. Urban 
Appendix 
Data Sources from IMS America 
We  hope that this discussion will serve as a useful reference for economists 
who will be using IMS sales data on pharmaceuticals in the future, as there are 
a number of important issues and quirks to the data which are not well docu- 
mented in IMS literature. 
U.S. Drugstore Audit and U.S. Hospital Audit 
A panel of  pharmaceutical wholesalers reports to IMS each month on the 
sales of  each presentational form (unit-dose syringes, bottles of  I00 tablets, 
etc.) of each drug product (Tagamet, Zantac, etc.) to drugstores and hospitals 
in the United States. From the sales reports they obtain in this audit, IMS com- 
putes national projections of the number of units and the dollars of revenue of 
each presentational form of each product sold each month in the United States, 
separately for drugstores and for hospitals. In recent years, the panel has grown 
to encompass nearly  the  entire universe  of  pharmaceutical  wholesalers,  ac- 
cording to IMS, making the audit nearly a full census and the projections there- 
fore quite accurate. 
One interesting feature of  all of the IMS data used in this study is that al- 
though  IMS has been collecting such data for decades, the company keeps 
computer records of only the immediate past six years, on a rolling basis. In 
order to have the opportunity to study the antiulcer market since its very incep- 
tion, which dates back over fifteen years, we chose to type in numbers from 
archived monthly IMS publications. The sales data from January 1986 through 
December 1991 come directly from IMS computer records, but all other IMS 
data used in this study were retyped. 
Because the sales data contained so many different numbers (quantities and 
revenues each month for each presentational form of each drug, for a total of 
over 5,200 retyped numbers in the fifteen-year sample, above and beyond the 
8,000  numbers provided by IMS in computer format), and because the original 
copies of the published data were often very difficult to read (often the num- 
bers were available only on poor-quality microfilm,  where a 3 was indistin- 
guishable from an 8), we deemed the possibility for error to be very high. We 
therefore chose to invest several months in ensuring the integrity of the retyped 
data by carefully checking it for typographical errors. It turns out that there is 
a reasonable degree of variation from month to month in the sales quantities 
and revenues for each individual drug presentation (variation often on the order 
of  10 percent or more), but the prices of the drug presentations (IMS-reported 
revenues divided by IMS-reported units) are relatively  stable. Therefore, our 
method of error correction was to sort the data by presentational form of each 
drug and then  print  separate graphs of  the drugstore and hospital  prices  of 
each presentation as a function of time. We were easily able to spot potential 315  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
typographical errors as outliers on these graphs, at which point we were able 
to correct the errors by checking them against copies of the original published 
data. (Unfortunately, we had to make more than one trip back to Philadelphia 
in order to obtain copies of data pages which were missing from our collection! 
It was easy to lose a page, or miss it in the first place, because our data were 
obtained from dozens of three-inch-thick monthly volumes of printed data, or 
their microfilm equivalents, in which the data of interest were contained on 
just a page or three in the middle of each hefty tome.) In all, we corrected a 
few dozen serious errors on the approximately one hundred graphs printed, but 
as a result we are now quite confident of the reliability of the data, to the extent 
that they accurately match the data collected by IMS. 
Nevertheless,  additional manipulations  remained to be performed  on this 
data set in order to put it into a form that would be useful for this study. First, 
as noted earlier, there were multiple presentational forms of each drug sold. To 
obtain a single number describing the quantity of each brand of drug (e.g., 
Tagamet) sold in a given month, we summed the total number of milligrams 
of the chemical sold that month. For example, if in August  1979 SmithKline 
sold 6,200 bottles of  100 Tagamet 300 mg tablets and 1,600 packages of  10 
unit-dose containers  of  10 ml of  Tagamet syrup at 5 mg/ml concentration, 
then we would compute the total number of milligrams of Tagamet sold that 
month as 
(6,200)( 100)(300 mg) + (1,600)( lo)( 10 m1)(5 mg/ml) = 186,800,000 mg. 
An  alternative  approach to constructing  a single monthly-sales  series for 
each drug, and one which a number of other studies have adopted, would be 
merely to proxy a drug’s total sales (units and revenues) by the sales of a single 
leading presentation. The advantage of this alternative approach is its computa- 
tional simplicity; by contrast, our method required dozens of additional hours 
of data manipulation. However, there is a serious disadvantage to the simpler 
approach, especially in this ulcer market, which is that the leading presentation 
changes over time. For example, see figure 7A.1, which displays the sales of 
Tagamet over time, broken down by  its four major product forms (note that 
even this is a simplification of the full sales data set, as for example, the portion 
of the graph corresponding to Tagamet 800 mg tablets represents a sum of two 
different presentational forms: bottles of 30 tablets and unit-dose packages of 
100 tablets).  From this graph, we see that although originally Tagamet was 
sold only in the 300 mg form, by  1992 the 400 mg form had become the lead- 
ing form, considerably overtaking the 300 mg sales. Other drugs in the sample 
present similar problems, having more than one presentation  which hold sig- 
nificant shares of the drug’s total sales. 
Also, we chose to include only those presentational forms which were in- 
tended to be taken orally by patients: tablets, capsules, and oral liquids. Ex- 
cluded were those forms packaged in vials, minibags, syringes, and so forth, 
for injection or intravenous administration. One reason for this decision is that 316  E. R. Berndt. L. T.  Bui, D.  H. Lucking-Reiley, and G. L. Urban 
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Fig. 7A.1  Tagamet drugstore sales 
we intended to concentrate our study mainly on the drugstore market, where 
the bulk of  the antiulcer sales occur and where detailing to physicians is most 
salient. By contrast, the non-oral preparations are developed mainly for hospi- 
tals, although some non-oral sales also show up in the drugstore market, pre- 
sumably for patients either in nursing homes or under hospice care. (For the 
twelve-month period ending in May  1993, drugstore sales revenues for non- 
oral presentations of H,-antagonists  were less than one-thousandth of the val- 
ues of revenues for oral presentations.  Even in the hospital market, non-oral 
presentations brought in less than half as much revenue as the oral presenta- 
tions during that time period.) A second, very substantive reason for including 
only the oral preparations is that we learned, from conversations with doctors 
and pharmaceutical marketing professionals, that the non-oral preparations are 
generally used for very different purposes: instead of healing painful ulcers in 
otherwise healthy people, as the tablets and capsules are intended to do, the 
intravenous administration of antiulcer medication is used mainly for the pre- 
vention of ulcers in emergency-room patients at risk for ulcers due to the in- 
creased acid secretion brought on by trauma, for example, and in patients who 
are at risk for ulcers due to regimens of large doses of nonsteroidal painkillers. 
Antiulcer medication may also be injected as part of a complete anesthesiology 
for surgery. These uses require very different numbers of milligrams of  a drug 
than do the standard therapies (duodenal ulcers, gastric ulcers, duodenal ulcer 
maintenance,  and GERD) that are usually administered  orally, and the price 
per milligram of drug tends to be an order of magnitude higher for the intrave- 
nous preparations (this is likely a combination of two effects: price discrimina- 
tion and the more complicated packaging and storage requirements of the in- 
travenous preparations). So rather  than confound the two types of  uses, we 
have chosen to define our market of interest to be the orally administered anti- 
ulcer drugs. 
Next, we had to find a way  to make the quantity units comparable across 
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example, treatment of an active duodenal ulcer with Tagamet requires 800 mg 
of drug to be ingested per day, but an equivalent therapy with Pepcid requires 
only 40 mg of drug. Each drug is a different chemical entity, with a different 
molecular weight, a different rate of absorption, and a different rate of binding 
to bioactive sites in the body, which combine to cause wide variations in the 
amount of each drug that must be consumed to achieve the same desired effect. 
Because marginal manufacturing costs in the pharmaceutical industry are gen- 
erally much lower than prices, we have chosen to concentrate on the demand 
side of the market in our choice of quantity units: patient-days of therapy. (This 
may have some concordance with the producer side as well, for although the 
different chemicals may not have the exact same marginal costs of  synthesis, 
it is at least plausible to assume that packaging the drug into tablets, and the 
tablets into bottles, should have approximately the same marginal cost per tab- 
let, regardless of the chemical  being  so packaged.)  This choice of quantity 
units considers 800 mg of Tagamet to be the same amount of drug as 40 mg of 
Pepcid, for purposes of computing sales levels and market shares, since these 
quantities are therapeutically equivalent. 
The quantity of  patient-days of therapy of a drug sold in a given month is 
equal to the total number of milligrams sold divided by the number of milli- 
grams per day of active duodenal ulcer therapy for that particular drug (in the 
case of Cytotec, which is not indicated for active duodenal ulcer therapy, we 
instead used the daily recommended dosage for NSAID-induced ulcer preven- 
tion). Thus, continuing our earlier example of Tagamet, we would find that in 
our hypothetical month, there were sold 
(186,800,000  mg)/(800 mg/day) = 233,500 patient-days of therapy. 
The numbers of milligrams per day of  therapy used for our quantity conver- 
sions are shown in table 7A. 1. 
Defining our quantity unit to be the total number of  milligrams divided by 
the standard dosage in milligrams per day is, unfortunately, not without prob- 
lems. First, the same drug may be used for slightly different therapies, and it 
may  be taken  in different dosages for the  different purposes. For example, 
Table 7A.1  Number of Milligrams per Day of Therapy Used for 
Quantity Conversions 
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Zantac may be prescribed at a dosage of 300 mg per day (either 300 mg once 
daily or 150 mg twice daily) for active duodenal ulcer, gastric ulcer, or GERD 
therapies, but its recommended  dosage for duodenal maintenance therapy is 
only  150 mg per day, half  of  that required  for the other therapies. Each of 
the H,-antagonists  has a similar prescribing regimen  for those four different 
indications. Therefore, our quantity measures are not literally the number of 
patient-days of therapy being consumed, but rather the number of patient-days 
of therapy which would be consumed if all of  the sales were for treatment of 
active duodenal ulcers. Second, while we have assumed that the milligram dos- 
age required for duodenal ulcer therapy remained constant over time, this was 
not the case for Tagamet. At the time of its introduction in  1977, the recom- 
mended dosage for duodenal ulcer therapy was 1,200 mg per day (300 mg four 
times daily), but subsequent experimentation showed that lower doses could 
be just as effective for ulcer healing, and by  1988 the recommended dosage 
was only 800 mg per day (either 800 mg once daily or 400 mg twice daily). 
We have taken the approach that a milligram of Tagamet in 1977 is the same 
quantity as a milligram of Tagamet in  1990, despite the fact that people may 
have been consuming fewer milligrams on average in the later years for the 
same length of treatment. Since we have no way of knowing how many duode- 
nal  ulcer  patients were  taking  1,200 mg  of  Tagamet rather  than  800 mg  at 
any point in time (the choice between the two depended upon the vagaries of 
individual doctors’ prescribing habits), we feel that we have chosen the most 
appropriate way to proceed. 
A final modification which needed to be made to the sales data concerns the 
fact that the data collection from pharmaceutical warehouse invoices has, at 
different times during the sample, been rather lumpy. This problem introduces 
seasonal noise into the data, which can be eliminated by rescaling  the sales 
and revenue figures. For purposes of rescaling, there are three distinct periods 
in our sample. Until December 1980, the sales audit was actually conducted at 
a sample of pharmacies rather than at warehouses, and there was no lumpiness 
to the data, so no rescaling was required. From January  1981 to December 
1989, the data were apparently (according to the best information we could 
obtain  from  IMS, whose  data  specialists  are not  accustomed  to answering 
questions about historical data) reported from warehouses on the basis of full 
weeks, so some months could contain four weeks of data, while others con- 
tained  five. This causes  large  month-to-month  variations  in  the  sales data, 
which is obviously inappropriate for a detailed monthly analysis of the com- 
petitive effects of  price and advertising on sales. A lengthy investigation has 
failed to reveal an appropriate way to rescale the data to correct for these fluc- 
tuations.  (Based on conversations with IMS representatives, we  tried several 
possibilities,  such as rescaling the data by the number of Wednesdays in each 
month, but none turned out to be correct.) Thus our best approximation to the 
truth is that the sales data for this period of time contain a component of sto- 
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1990 to the present, the number of reporting weeks per month were standard- 
ized so that the first four weeks of  the year were designated as January, the 
next four weeks as February, the next five weeks as March, and so on in a 4-4-5 
pattern for each quarter. (The single exception is December  1991, which for 
accounting purposes-there  are not exactly fifty-two weeks in each year-was 
designated as a month of six weeks rather than of five). To rescale the data for 
our purposes, we divided the IMS sales figures in each month from January 
1990  to the end of the sample by the number of reporting weeks in that month, 
and then multiplied by 4.33 in order to retain the same normalization of physi- 
cal units as in the original IMS data. 
Finally, in order to transform the nominal prices from the IMS data into real 
prices, we deflated by the CPI (1982-84  base years). 
National Detailing Audit 
The National Detailing Audit (which as of  1993 has been subsumed by the 
Office Contact Report of IMS’s Integrated Promotional Services) is a service 
that collects data from a nationwide panel of  doctors about the visits which 
have been paid to them by pharmaceutical sales representatives. The doctors 
participating in the panel keep a log of the number of minutes they spend talk- 
ing to detailers on each detail visit. If the detailer talks to the doctor about 
more than one product (for example, a Lilly detailer might discuss both Axid, 
an ulcer drug, and Ceclor, an antibiotic, with a family doctor), the physician 
makes an estimate of how many minutes were devoted to each product. From 
this panel, IMS then reports nationally projected estimates of  the number of 
details and the number of minutes spent detailing each product, each month. 
The detailing data series, unlike the  sales data series, consist of  only one 
observation  per month, since detailing is performed  at the level of the drug 
brand, rather than at the level of the presentational form. This fact made typo- 
graphical errors a much smaller problem than they were in the sales data, de- 
spite the fact that we had to enter manually the detailing data for every month 
in the more than fifteen years of  our sample. We  collected monthly data on 
details and minutes for our seven drugs of interest, as well  as for  the total 
number of  details and minutes done by each of the manufacturers producing 
these drugs (across all of their products)  and for the total number of details 
and minutes in the entire US.  pharmaceutical industry. These last two types of 
data are intended to be  used  as instruments for brand detailing, which is a 
potentially endogenous variable. 
Beyond typographical errors, there were still some corrections to be made. 
In 1986, IMS expanded its panel of doctors from fourteen hundred physicians 
reporting two weeks of  every month to twenty-eight hundred physicians  re- 
porting full months. Concurrently, they changed their projection methodology, 
and it turns out that a scaling factor of 0.74 must be applied to the data for all 
months prior to January  1986 in order to make them comparable to the data 
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IMS cautions that it is much more confident in its ability to measure the relative 
shares of detailing by different products than in its ability to measure absolute 
levels. Nevertheless, we assume that after applying the recommended transfor- 
mations, we can make reasonably accurate comparisons of the levels of detail- 
ing in different periods.) 
A  second  change  occurred  in January  1993, when  IMS  significantly  in- 
creased the breadth  of  coverage of  detailing data. Under the  newly  created 
Integrated Promotional Services, there exists a wide variety of reports, includ- 
ing the Office Contact Report, which is the most directly related to the now- 
defunct National Detailing Audit. In the Office Contact Report, there are now 
reported many more types of details, including sample drops, educational vis- 
its, service visits, and telephone calls, than were reported before, so the data 
on details and minutes are not easily comparable. 
We were able to construct a measure of the number of details for 1993  which 
would be comparable to the pre- 1993 years by looking at the new breakdown 
of  details into the various new IMS categories, and counting as details only 
those visits which were either “full discussion” details or “brief mention” de- 
tails, which is what IMS considers to be the “traditional” details that doctors 
were intended to include in their reports for the National Detailing Audit prior 
to 1993. Although similarly disaggregated information on minutes of detailing 
are not readily available from IMS’s printed reports, we were able to match up 
minutes of detailing from  1993 on with the pre-1993 data on minutes before 
1993 by  special  arrangement  with  IMS, who  provided  us  with  computer- 
generated reports from their database on the number of minutes of detailing in 
1993 devoted to full discussions and brief mentions. 
National Journal Audit 
In this  audit, IMS performs  a complete census of  advertising in medical 
journals. They subscribe to every known medical journal and examine every 
advertisement in every issue of each journal. They note the number of whole 
and partial pages, the number of colors used in printing the ads, the location 
of the advertisement in the journal (e.g., if it was found at the very front or 
printed  on the back cover, in either case getting more exposure than  an ad 
buried in the middle of the publication), and other attributes that affect the cost 
of  placing an advertisement. Then, using  standard rate sheets, they compute 
the cost of each of the advertisements placed. Reported in the National Journal 
Audit monthly report are the total number of  pages of advertising published 
for each product in that month (weighting all journals equally, regardless of 
circulation or professional influence), as well as the total estimated cost of all 
medical journal ads for that product. 
We consider the cost figure to be the most accurate single measure of  the 
amount of medical journal advertising done for a particular product, because 
(assuming that medical journal advertising is close to being a competitive in- 
dustry) the prices of the ads reflect the reach of the advertisements, in terms of 
number of doctors reached, visual impact of the advertisement (through color, 321  The U.S. Antiulcer Drug Industry 
for example), and so forth. These cost figures are reported in nominal dollars, 
so to obtain a real measure  of  medical journal advertising effort, we deflate 
these series by the producer price index for “advertising in professional and 
institutional periodicals” (BLS product code 272 1-415). 
As with the detailing data, the series we collected from the National Journal 
Audit include monthly series for each drug product in our sample, as well as 
monthly series on total monthly advertising for each manufacturer producing 
one of the products in our sample on total monthly advertising by the pharma- 
ceutical industry as a whole. 
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Zantac, the entrant, brought new growth to the market, due to its lower dosage 
frequency and friendlier side-effect profile, but it also clearly stole customers 
from the incumbent, Tagamet, with its aggressive marketing campaign. Thus, 
the  antiulcer  drug  market  is a  fascinating  arena within  which  to  study, as 
Berndt, Bui, Lucking-Reiley, and Urban do so well in their paper, the effects 
of marketing on the growth of industry sales and individual market shares. 
Theoretically, there are several ways that oligopolistic rivalry could manifest 
itself in pharmaceutical markets. Naturally, there could be intense price com- 
petition. As the authors point out, Zantac’s price premium over Tagamet de- 
creased from 56 percent to 25 percent over their sample period. Still, the evi- 
dence presented does not point to price as the primary competitive tool, The 
second potential form of rivalry is the race to win FDA approval for various 
treatments (the most important in this market being GERD). The third form 
that competition could take is a battle to offer the most attractive package of 
nonprice attributes, such as dosage frequency and side-effect profile, among 
others. The fourth form is advertising, both persuasive and informative. 
SmithKline did, in fact, move to match Zantac’s more favorable dosing fre- 
quency by  eventually coming out with a twice-a-day and then a once-a-day 
version of Tagamet. There was, however, little that they could do to alter the 
side-effect profile of Tagamet, the aspect of Tagamet perceived by doctors to be 
its weakest in head-to-head  competition  with Zantac. SmithKline’s strongest 
weapon was to match Glaxo’s aggressive advertising campaign with its own, 
making counterclaims about the side-effect profile and general effectiveness of 
Tagamet. Advertising is thus an important, if not the most important, strategic 
variable in this market. 
In this paper, the authors analyze the factors affecting market  shares and 
present  evidence on the  strength of  first-mover  advantages in this industry. 
However, the notable empirical contribution of the paper is their effort to sepa- 
rate empirically the strength of  industry-expanding  advertising from rivalrous 
advertising,  and further, to investigate whether  the strength of  these effects 
varies with changes in market structure. I will therefore focus my comments 
on their contribution to this latter line of research. 
Analysis of Industry Demand 
ify the “effective industry-marketing stock” (M,)  as 
The authors begin with an analysis of the growth of industry sales and spec- 
The assumption, long standard in advertising literature, is that advertising is 
long-lived and that the stock of advertising, rather than the monthly flow, is the 
primary force driving industry sales. 
The next step, however, is not standard. The authors go on to specify the 
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marketing effort, where the weights reflect changes in market structure as en- 
try occurs: 
M,  = PIMI,, + kzK.,  + k3M,,, + ‘ . . + FkMk,,. 
That is, marketing efforts are posited to have a differential effect on industry 
sales as the market structure changes. The specific hypothesis to be tested is 
that p2 > k, > . . . > kk,  where kl  has been normalized to one. This hypothe- 
sis is based on the premise that industry efforts directed at market expansion 
will decline as the number of products in the industry increases. In other words, 
with an increasing number of products, ceteris paribus, a decreasing fraction 
of each advertising dollar will have a market-expanding impact (e.g.. total ad- 
vertising dollars expended in a duopoly market will have a smaller impact on 
industry demand than the same advertising dollars spent in a monopoly). The 
authors specify their hypotheses in terms of the number of  products on the 
market,  which is equal to the number  of firms in this  case. Presumably, in 
the general case, both the number of firms and the number of brands in exis- 
tence will affect the outcome. 
The next step is to specify the industry sales regression, which is a function 
of a real price index, the stock of detailing minutes, the stock of pages of adver- 
tising in medical journals,  and a dummy variable  which indicates FDA ap- 
proval for GERD. Both detailing stock and journal pages stock are functions 
of  the  k’s.  The  parameters are constrained to be the same across detailing 
and journal advertising, but they are permitted to differ as the number of prod- 
ucts in the industry grows. 
For the Tagamet-Zantac model, using NL-2SLS, 6 is estimated as near zero. 
Note that, econometrically,  the spike in Zantac detailing in  1983 may be the 
driving force behind  the 6 estimate of  zero. However, the zero depreciation 
rate may, in fact, be an accurate reflection  of  the patterns of  depreciation in 
the stock of knowledge in prescription drug markets. There is evidence in the 
literature that doctors tend to stay with what they know, that is, the drugs that 
they  became  familiar  with  during  their  medical  residency.  Leffler  (198 1) 
discusses this issue in the context of  what he calls uninformative  reminder 
ads. He finds that “advertisers tend to focus their advertisements on the phy- 
sician  age group that  was  in  medical  school  when  the  product  was  intro- 
duced” (63). 
Scouler (1993) also presents survey evidence that there is a high retention 
rate of knowledge created by advertising and physician education. Table 7C.  1 
shows  how  doctors’  perceptions  of  a drug might  differ  from the  medical 
“facts” as published in the Physicians’  Desk Reference (PDR) and also how 
these perceptions tend to persist through time. Tagamet is clearly perceived as 
an inferior product compared to Zantac for “adverse reactions” and “heal rate,” 
despite a reasonably close ranking between the two drugs in the PDR. In fact, 
table 7C.  1 shows that the PDR actually ranks Tagamet as superior in terms of 
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Table 7C.1  Physicians’ Ranking of Tagamet and Zantac among Eight 
Antiulcer Drugs 
Adverse Reactions  Drug Interactions  Heal Rate 
Tagamet 
Physicians  6  8  5 
PDR  3  7  3 
Physicians  2  4  2 
Zantac 
PDR  5  3.5  4 
Source; Excerpted from table 4.14 of  Scouler (1993.68-70). 
Note: The eight drugs included in the ranking are Reglan, Tagamet, Carafate, Axid, Zantac, Pepcid, 
Cytotec, and Prilosec. 
nor safety were formed as a result of Zantac’s initial marketing campaign, then 
physicians’ perceptions are clearly difficult to sway. 
The Tagamet-Zantac model’s estimate for the value of p2  (0.89) implies that, 
relative to a monopoly, marketing stocks are roughly 90 percent as effective in 
changing industry sales when they occur in a duopoly. There seems, then, to 
be little change in the effectiveness of market-enhancing advertising when the 
market becomes a duopoly. One wonders whether the authors were expecting 
a bigger drop in advertising effectiveness when moving from one to two firms. 
In future research, it would be interesting to learn whether this is a common 
result across other pharmaceutical markets. 
For the four-product model, the depreciation rate is again near zero, with 
p2 = 0.6, pj = 0.8, and k4  = 0.5. This is not quite the monotonic pattern 
that the authors expected. One plausible explanation for this pattern is that the 
dynamics of competition are potentially very different in an unbalanced three- 
firm industry from that in a balanced (equal market share) four-firm industry. 
For example, when the third drug, Axid, came onto the market, there was a 
highly skewed distribution of firm sizes: SmithKline and Glaxo may have been 
relatively unconcerned about competition from Axid. Similarly, when the num- 
ber of firms increases from three to four, the nature of competition can change 
in a variety of ways. In the antiulcer market, there might not have been a four- 
firm rivalry, but rather one battle between firms one and two and another battle 
between firms three and four. It is not at all clear that we can assume the rela- 
tionship among the p’s to be monotonically declining without knowing more 
about the structural interpretation of the estimates. 
Sutton (1991) also discusses in detail the relationship between setup costs, 
advertising outlays, and the equilibrium structure of the industry. He maintains 
that there is an initial outlay to create a brand image and then a defensive flow 
of advertising to maintain that image. Several of the examples he presents in 
the first few chapters of  his book show that the relationship between market 
size and concentration (in the presence of advertising) is nonmonotonic. While 
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implications  for the interpretation  of  their empirical results,  given that  they 
measure  market  structure by  the number  of  firms in the industry. Again,  if 
concentration is not perfectly correlated with the number of  firms or the size 
of  the  market,  then  it is hard  to  say what the  relationship  between  the  p’s 
should be. 
The authors appropriately note that the model should be extended to incor- 
porate  a dynamic diffusion  process.  Advertising,  for example, may  have  a 
smaller impact on industry sales as the number of products increases because 
the market is saturated with advertising messages. Or, the cost of advertising 
may rise over time as firms experiment with less-profitable ways of reaching 
physicians (such as periodicals  with lower circulation levels or television ad- 
vertisements that tell consumers to talk to their doctors). 
Finally, there  is  a natural experiment  looming on the horizon  for testing 
developments in market-enhancing  advertising for the antiulcer market. With 
the recent news over the last couple of years about the role of Helicobacter 
pylori bacteria in causing peptic ulcers, we should see an increase in market- 
enhancing advertising by the H,-antagonist  manufacturers. This highlights the 
more general point that the level of market-enhancing advertising, in addition 
to being a function of  market structure within the H,-antagonist  industry, is 
also a function of the stock of advertising goodwill generated by competing 
classes  of  drugs (such as antacids,  and, in the future, the treatment  for H. 
pylori). 
Analysis of Market Shares 
lows (where all variables are defined relative to Tagamet): 
The model used to analyze those factors effecting market shares is as fol- 
Relative Share =  f(  ENTRY, P,  MIN, DGERD, FREQ, INT, AGE). 
The main finding is that for the two-product submarket, the estimated deprecia- 
tion rate of rivalrous advertising is again roughly zero. However, for the four- 
product market the authors estimate an annual depreciation rate of the relative 
detailing stock of approximately 38 percent (or  40 percent under 2SLS estima- 
tion). Also, as has been found in many other industries, the order-of-entry ef- 
fects are large and significant. 
There are several modifications that could be made to the specification of 
the effective marketing  stock that  would  be interesting to pursue.  First, the 
stock variable could be broadened to include significant positive and negative 
reports in  scientific journals about a particular  product.  Second, it is worth 
noting  that by  the time Zantac  was  being  sold in  the United States, it had 
already  achieved  a  thirty  percent  market  share  in  the  European  market 
(Dell’Osso 1990).  Thus, the stock of knowledge in the rivalrous context in the 
United States did not start from zero. Finally, there might be important spill- 
overs within a firm if a firm’s stock of advertising goodwill carries over from 
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Connection with the Literature 
Traditional literature on advertising has focused on the relationship between 
advertising and profits, concentration, and market share. Recent theoretical lit- 
erature has moved on to examine the dynamic nature of equilibrium advertis- 
ing strategies. One open empirical question which relates directly to the Berndt 
et al. paper is whether firms use open-loop strategies (where advertising is a 
function only of  time), or closed-loop strategies (where advertising is a func- 
tion of time and some measure of the state of the system, such as market share). 
Roberts and Samuelson (1988) develop a general open-loop model and esti- 
mate it using data for U.S. cigarette producers. Their analysis of advertising 
includes  the  theoretical  modeling  and empirical estimation  of  both  the ri- 
valrous effects of advertising and the market-expanding  effects. The durable 
nature of advertising implies that the current sales of a firm will depend on the 
past history of its own and its rivals’ advertising expenditures. A firm with a “na- 
ive” strategy will choose the optimal level of goodwill stocks, given the stocks 
of other firms. A firm with a “sophisticated” strategy recognizes that its choice 
of advertising stock may alter its rivals’ choices of future advertising stocks. 
Their empirical model includes estimating equations for firm demand, pro- 
duction  cost, and optimal advertising  choice. Cost functions  and factor de- 
mands are estimated first and are used to construct estimates of marginal cost. 
The market-share  equations and first-order conditions for advertising choice 
are then estimated as a simultaneous system.  As with Berndt et al., the depreci- 
ation rate (specified in Roberts and Samuelson as a retention rate) can differ 
across submarkets (in this case, the low-tar and high-tar cigarette markets) but 
does not differ across firms. 
Roberts and Samuelson find that (1) advertising does not have a significant 
effect on firm’s market shares; (2)  a firm can increase its market share by in- 
creasing the number of brands it offers; (3) advertising by one firm may in- 
crease total market demand; (4) the estimated retention  rates of  advertising 
stock are approximately  0.8 for the low-tar market and 0.9 for the high-tar 
market; (5)  naive behavior by firms can be rejected; and (6) strategies differ 
across firms within  a market.  Specifically, they find that for the two largest 
firms, demand is increased for each by the advertising of their rivals, while for 
the three smaller firms, the rivalrous aspects of rivals’ advertising dominate 
and the demand for their product falls as rival-firm  advertising is increased. 
Finally, in the same spirit as the Berndt et al. paper, they find that as the market 
increases in size, ceteris paribus, market-enhancing  advertising diminishes in 
importance. 
In a paper along similar lines, Gasmi, Laffont, and Vuong (1 990) decom- 
pose advertising elasticities into the sum of what they call a “predatory elastic- 
ity”  and a “global elasticity.” Estimating their model  on data from the soft 
drink industry, they find that both elasticities are significant (and with the ex- 
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rival but also has a positive effect on total market demand).  As with the Roberts 
and Samuelson paper, the estimated elasticities vary across firms. 
These results raise several interesting questions for research on the role of 
advertising within pharmaceutical markets. First, an intriguing conclusion of 
Roberts and Samuelson is that “[ t]he market-share aspects of oligopolistic ri- 
valry are better captured through changes in the number of brands sold by the 
firms, rather than by changes in advertising” (1988,215). This makes one won- 
der whether a similar effect would be found in pharmaceutical markets, where 
the equivalent measure of the number of brands might be the number of pre- 
sentations of a drug (e.g., 30 mg tablets, 100 mg tablets, and liquid forms). 
Second, the results suggest that aggregate rival advertising goodwill may be- 
long in the market-share equation, rather than simply the stock relative to the 
first entrant, as in the Berndt et al. paper. Finally, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether firms in the antiulcer market chose different advertising 
strategies in the duodenal ulcer submarket versus the GERD submarket and, if 
so, whether those differences can be tied to a structural explanation. 
Conclusion 
This paper raises important industrial organization questions about advertis- 
ing and market  structure and, through  meticulous handling  of  the data and 
careful econometric work, gives us insights into the important question of ad- 
vertising and market structure. As the authors point out, there is room for future 
work. Some of the most interesting questions deal with differences across firms 
and the explicit modeling of the intertemporal dependence of a firm’s choice 
of advertising strategy. Overall, there is much to be gained from a continued 
detailed study of advertising in this industry. 
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